

FORUM ON CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION

THE POLITICS OF HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT



Li Anshan and Funeka Yazini April (eds)

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**Africa Institute
of South Africa**
Development Through Knowledge

Forum on China-Africa Cooperation

The Politics of Human Resource Development

Li Anshan

and

Funeka Yazini April (eds)



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CONTENTS

About the Editors.....	i
------------------------	---

About the Contributors	iii
------------------------------	-----

Chapter One: Soft power dynamics of human resource development cooperation and exchanges	1
Introduction.....	1
Outline of the monograph.....	4
Conclusion	7
References.....	8

Chapter Two: The implications of human resources development through Sino-Africa relations	10
Introduction.....	10
Conceptual matters: human resource development in Africa.....	11
Africa's human resource developmental challenges.....	13
China-Africa cooperation in the health and agriculture sectors	17
Health diplomacy under FOCAC.....	19
AU agriculture development challenges and FOCAC	21
Conclusion	24
References.....	25

Chapter Three: Dissecting soft power and Sino-Africa relations in education and exchanges cooperation	28
Introduction.....	28
FOCAC as a soft power imperative	31
An assessment of educational cooperation under FOCAC.....	33
Conclusion	39
References.....	40

Chapter Four: Sino-Africa dynamics of joint knowledge production: prospects and challenges	43
Introduction.....	43
Background.....	46
The influence of the brain drain on knowledge production	50
Harnessing political will for increased knowledge production.....	53
Donor dependence and policy transfer	58
Conclusion	59
References.....	61

Chapter Five: Chinese medical cooperation in Africa from the pre-FOCAC era to the present	64
Introduction.....	64
The Chinese medical team at work	65
China's anti-malaria campaign in Africa.....	66
Serving Africans the Chinese way	70

Improving the local medical system	71
Raising local medical standards	73
Conclusion	75
References.....	76

Chapter Six: Assessing the complexities of Sino-African media exchange and cooperation 81

Introduction.....	81
Sino-Africa exchange and cooperation to date	84
The complexities of establishing mutual understanding between Africa and China through media cooperation.....	86
Branding of Sino-Africa relations	90
Conclusion	93
References.....	94

Chapter Seven: The way forward for FOCAC and human resource development 2012–2015 97

References.....	103
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CHAPTER ONE

Soft power dynamics of human resource development cooperation and exchanges

Li Anshan and Funeka Yazini April

Introduction

The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), established for the first time in October 2000 in Beijing, constitutes a platform for African and Chinese policy-makers to strengthen Sino-Africa relations. The first FOCAC meeting was held in Beijing from 10–12 October 2000, and attended by over 800 officials from China and 44 African countries. This forum is intended to ‘strengthen the friendly cooperation between China and Africa to jointly meet the challenge of globalisation and promote common development’.¹ Specific plans of action presented included an expansion of trade, investment, joint projects and increased cooperation in the fields of agriculture, transportation, medical care, the exploitation of natural resources and banking.

The second FOCAC meeting was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 15–16 December 2003. The central theme of the second ministerial conference was a pragmatic and action-orientated cooperation. Premier Wen Jiabao proposed a four point programme for the further consolidation of Sino-African relations through mutual support; democratisation of international relations; meeting the challenge of globalisation together; and enhanced cooperation at all levels. The conference produced the FOCAC Addis Ababa Action Plan 2004–2006, which further outlined future China-Africa cooperation where it stated that:

On social and development issues China promised to expand its African Human Resources Development Fund to train up to 10 000 African technicians over three years, to enhance its assistance on medical care and public health, to provide technical training in agriculture, to cancel outstanding debts of select countries, and to encourage cultural and people-to-people exchanges.²

At the 2006 FOCAC meeting held in Beijing in October and attended by 48 African countries, President Hu Jintao stressed the long history of China-Africa cooperation and the common objective of economic development and prosperity. There were various key outcomes that came out of the third FOCAC meeting, including China's offer to facilitate training of 15 000 African professionals, build hospitals, malaria prevention centres, schools and double the number of Chinese scholarships offered to African students.³ The fourth FOCAC meeting took place in Cairo, Egypt on 18–20 October 2008. Against the backdrop of the current global financial crisis, two key areas of discussion covered were 'China-Africa agricultural cooperation and food security' and 'infrastructure construction'.⁴

The 2012 FOCAC meeting was considered ground-breaking, with China's offer to extend a US\$ 20 billion credit-line to the continent over the next three years, and the increased cooperation between the two regions in operationalising the African Union's (AU) Africa's Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).⁵ This time the Beijing Declaration presented a six-point proposal to elevate the Sino-African strategic partnership which not only addressed peace and security matters, but again emphasised the deepening cooperation in areas of trade, investment, poverty reduction, infrastructure building, capacity building, human resources development, food security and hi-tech industries. The meeting also proposed to continue strengthening people-to-people and cultural exchanges and cooperation between the two sides.

This monograph assesses specific measures raised at FOCAC which include training and exchange, human resource development, medical cooperation and knowledge production. The chapters demonstrate how the aforementioned measures not only promote sustainable development particularly in Africa, but also illustrate a different angle as to how FOCAC is strengthening relations between the two regions through cultural forces. The influence of the cultural factor in contemporary international relations has been widely examined by scholars, including Lawrence Harrison in his 1992 book entitled *Who Prospers? How Cultural Values Shape Economic and Political Success*, Samuel Huntington in his article 'The Clash of Civilisations?' and Francis Fukuyama's 1995 book entitled *Trust: The Social Virtue and the Creation of Prosperity*.⁶

Other scholars argue that FOCAC has become an international brand name owing to China's ability to utilise soft power on the continent. Joseph Nye – who coined the soft power concept – identifies three broad categories of soft power: culture, political values, and policies.⁷ Nye argues that soft

power is more than influence, since influence can also rest on the hard power of threats or payments. Soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument, though that is an important part of it. Soft power, he maintains, is also the ability to attract, and attraction often leads to acquiescence. It is the attraction aspect that many scholars attribute to the Sino-African soft power relationship whereby African leaders who are desperate for industrialisation tend to acquiesce to the prospects of infrastructural development in exchange for natural resources. Public and cultural diplomacy are key areas of soft power discussed in this monograph.⁸

China's foreign policy measures of soft power cannot be ruled out at any FOCAC discussion. The fact is that although FOCAC is a joint collaboration between China and Africa, FOCAC activities are actively driven and led by the Chinese government. This collaboration is driven by China's drive to not only preserve its economic and natural interests – which is to be expected in the realm of international relations – but also by China's cultural thinking and history. It is also important to note that though there are many regional groupings – such as the European Union-African Union Heads of State Summit, and the North American Free Trade Agreement – FOCAC has become the most effective and dominant alliance. Unlike other summit meetings, FOCAC is very output-based, with specific agendas that are established (and delivered on!), with impact assessments every four years. Needless to say, the reason behind the growing global interest in FOCAC, is due to China's soft power impact on the continent. The objective of this monograph is to therefore assess the impact of FOCAC through human resource development initiatives between the two regions from a cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy perspective.

Culture, as Fukuyama states, provides the dominant blueprint for social and economic institutions such as the FOCAC-designed models, and hence exerts tremendous impact on national behaviour and its fate in the international community. Public diplomacy may be defined simply, as the conduct of international relations by governments through public communications media and through dealings with a wide range of non-governmental entities such as political parties, corporations, trade associations, labour unions and educational institutions for the purpose of influencing the politics and actions of other governments.⁹ The issue then becomes, what is the impact of China's soft power blueprint through its education, academic exchanges, training and skills development and medical cooperation on the African continent's future? What does it mean for China to promote human resource capacity and development through

cultural or public diplomacy? What does it mean for Africa to engage in the human resource development initiatives in a joint fashion?

Outline of the monograph

As indicated earlier, at the recent 2012 FOCAC meeting, President Hu Jintao indicated how China has trained close to 40 000 African personnel in various sectors and provided over 20 000 government scholarships to individuals in African countries.¹⁰ The president also stated how 20 pairs of leading Chinese and African universities have entered into cooperation under the 20+20 Cooperation Plan for Chinese and African Institutions of Higher Education. China and Africa have also set up 29 Confucius Institutes in 22 African countries.¹¹

It is within this context of successful resource development over the years, that both Chapters Two and Three examine issues of human resource development with a focus on training and educational exchanges. Chapter Two also establishes how China-Africa cooperation in the education sector is perhaps the most prominent element of this thriving relationship. Human resource development is one of the key drivers for any country's economic development, and the author discusses two areas of human resource development – health and agriculture – from a public diplomacy perspective. An historical analysis of the human resource development with Western donors and the failed attempts at continental capacity building is presented. According to Kenneth King, China is unique among donors in having the FOCAC educational mechanism, that deals with virtually the whole of Africa. Moreover – unlike many traditional donors such as France and Britain – China does not cooperate principally with a special subset of countries with historic, linguistic, geographic or economic ties with the donor country. Rather, relations are presented as elements of a joint agreement between two partners, 'featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchanges'.¹² Therefore, China's unique donor strategy is bound to have a positive impact on capacity building on the continent.

Chapter Three examines how education and exchange under FOCAC serves as an effective tool of public diplomacy for China in Africa. The author attempts to show how China's version of soft power – which is based on partnership and mutual respect – has been accepted by most African countries. In other words, African governments are confident in addressing education development with China given the zero political conditions

attached and China's commitment to deliver. The author provides extensive background on China-Africa education and cooperation, and makes a case for China using its training and exchange programme as a soft power mechanism tool to promote Chinese cultural interests.

The author emphasises this factor through his comparison of Western volunteer programmes and their impact on winning the 'hearts and minds' of people. A comparative example is the Peace Corps designed as a foreign policy strategy to meet political needs related to the Cold War era. Another example shows how the generosity and dedication of US volunteers helped to improve the US's international image and serves America's diplomatic strategy and national interests. Historically, the idea of education as a tool of public diplomacy and a medium for peace in the world through better understanding, is an American strategy that dates from the post-WWII era of 1945–1970. Today, the US remains the world leader in international education: firstly as a host country of the largest number of foreign students, and secondly as 'the' model to be duplicated worldwide.¹³ The author's frankness in advocating human resource development as a soft power tool for China is refreshing. However, it raises a fundamental question as to Africa's long-term position regarding the FOCAC educational measures.

There is a shift in Chapter Four, which focuses on a need for Africa to promote its industrial strategy through increased research cooperation under FOCAC. The author discusses how research cooperation between the two regions has been re-emphasised by President Hu Jintao at the July 2012 FOCAC where proposed measures to continue to implement the China-Africa Joint Research and Exchange Plan and to sponsor 100 programmes for research, exchange and cooperation by academic institutions and scholars of the two sides, were submitted.¹⁴ The chapter maintains that given China's level as one of the world's top knowledge producers, the proposed research cooperation is critical as the Sino-Africa initiative promulgated by FOCAC offers opportunities for transferring policy experiences, technologies and finance to boost industrial productivity on the continent.

Chapter Five stresses the need for Africa to become more knowledge-driven on the basis that the structure of knowledge production is changing fast and that there is a growing competition between states. As Susan Strange predicted years before the World Wide Web, state or economic power would no longer be territory-based, but knowledge-based.¹⁵ This chapter also examines the constraints limiting the capacity for joint research collaboration under FOCAC that needs to be addressed, particularly from

Africa's side. These constraints include issues such as limited political will from African governments, policy transfer related to donor dependence, and lack of skills and research capacity for industrial implementation.

Chapter Six is an extended discussion on health diplomacy and details the history of medical health and various initiatives that have been undertaken by China in Africa. The chapter provides extensive historical detail on how, over the past 46 years, China has dispatched China Medical Teams (CMT) to provide free medical service along with free facilities and medication, trained African medical personnel, and built hospitals in various African countries. Throughout the discussion it is evident that medical cooperation is essential and continues to undergo several challenges such as a heavy burden of communicable and non-communicable diseases. The African Regional Health Report – the first study to look at health trends among 738 million Africans – maintains that more investment was needed to eliminate disease and tackle poverty caused by Aids. In fact, the health situation in many African countries has not improved in recent years, and in some cases has worsened. Moreover, cost-effective interventions that can prevent the disease burden do exist, but coverage is too low owing to health system weaknesses. It is against the background of the continent's continued health crisis that the medical cooperation between China and Africa is essential.

Interestingly enough, while there has been a lot of media focus/coverage regarding China's increasing trade with Africa, there has been limited coverage of the much needed medical aid China has been giving to millions of Africans for the past 50 years. China's ministry of health statistics indicate that by the end of 2010, China had sent 17 000 medical workers to 48 African countries, treating 200 million patients.¹⁶ Through this medical aid, the Asian country has directly created stronger bonds with the locals in many African countries who cannot afford to get treatment for their ailments because of dire poverty.¹⁷

Chapter Seven is a thought-provoking final chapter as it displays how the continent is still enslaved by its history given its total dependence on the Western media for information dissemination. Currently most of Sub-Saharan Africa's media training, policies, technology, news values, language and advertising favours the neo-colonial status quo. The foreign dominance raises concerns as to how FOCAC can elevate a China-Africa media platform where south-south perspectives using different cultural dynamics can be effectively raised. The author also touches on the controversial issue of nation branding, and demonstrates how both regions

are tarred by very negative media brushes in the global community. (The context of negative reporting however, has to be contextualised within the frame that media is a business, and bad news sells.) The author emphasises that both regions should consider a media platform along China's FOCAC V proposal to set up a China-Africa Press Exchange Centre. The author concurs with the FOCAC media action plan and debates how cultural diplomacy plays a major role in making the Sino-Africa relationship fruitful.

Conclusion

What does the impact of the FOCAC initiatives on educational exchanges and human resources capacity mean for the future? From the African point of view, human resources are being developed on the continent. While China's cultural influence is present, it is not done to impose superpower practices, but implemented as a method of alleviating poverty and promoting better understanding between the two regions. It is also important to note that the FOCAC framework has added value to Africans because it is operated as a uniquely Pan-African modality for relating to Africa, and within that, there have been a series of human resource development, education and training commitments agreed upon by both regions, which has not always been the case with other donor countries.

At some level, for FOCAC to create a more meaningful impact, there will be a need for both Africans and Chinese to understand each other better. From the Chinese point of view, the cultural influence in Africa comprises a very important part and significant manifestation of soft power as well. After the Beijing FOCAC meeting, Thabo Mbeki, former president of South Africa, wrote an article titled '*At the Heavenly Gate in Beijing Hope is Born*' highly praising China's 'great achievements in development' and its practical significance to Africa.¹⁸

In an age of global interdependence, international or regional multilateral mechanisms constitute a platform for a nation to show its national image. China has established an efficient way under FOCAC to establish its country's image and promote its international position and influence through actively ensuring that its social and human development activities on the continent, become a reality in a very short time. Since the establishment of FOCAC, China and Africa have had substantial dialogues about furthering various aspects of culture and education cooperation between the two regions. The Chinese government has firmly kept its promises to provide the human resource assistance to African countries

within the stipulated time. There is a lot more that can still be accomplished under the FOCAC umbrella in promoting cooperation and development between the two regions, however, the onus is now on Africa to play a more constructive role in the relationship.

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CHAPTER TWO

The implications of human resources development through Sino-Africa relations

David Monyae

Introduction

Regional economic integration has been a main pre-occupation of African leaders since independence from colonial rule in the 1960s. The attempt to build a broad continental coalition in favour of the establishment of the Africa's Economic Community¹ can be seen in the charter of the Organisation of African Unity – now the African Union (AU) – formed in 1963, the Lagos Plan of Action 1980 and the New Partnership for African Development in 2001.² In all these coalitions, Africans clearly defined the challenges and opportunities of the continent. It was also a widely accepted belief, in all of the above, that human resources form the fundamental backbone of a functioning state and continent. Therefore, human resource development was identified as one of the major prerequisites for development in Africa.

To achieve developmental targets as outlined in the United Nations' (UN's) Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for the continent, African leaders devised numerous strategies and tactics. One such strategy was to establish new strategic alliances with countries in the developed world as well as strengthening ties with global institutions for economic and political governance, i.e. International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. In the past decade, a wide range of initiatives and partnerships were launched between Africa and the European Union, and the continent further reached out to India, Brazil and China.

However, it has been China-Africa relations that have captured the imagination of scholars. The main aim of this chapter is to critically analyse China-Africa relations through the prisms of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) officially launched in 2000. It is, however, limited in its scope and focuses on China-Africa cooperation in the field of human resource development in Africa, one of FOCAC's strategic objectives.

The chapter assesses two areas of human resource development: health and agriculture. China's implementation of the health and agricultural programmes under FOCAC are examined from a public diplomacy point of view.

In international relations, public diplomacy – or people's diplomacy, broadly speaking – is the communication with foreign publics to establish a dialogue through an institution designed to inform and influence. Diplomacy deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. As described by Nicholas Cull, it encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of intercultural communications.³

Conceptual matters: human resource development in Africa

What is now commonly known as human resource studies can be traced back to classical economists such as Adam Smith. Throughout its history, the thread that seems to run through human resource theory is the argument that 'human resource or capital is merely another productive input on par with physical capital or natural resources.'⁴ As such, the three major assumptions made by the human capital model are:

- Human resource should be perceived as capital
- Developed human capital has an output that gradually contributes to national product
- The amount invested in capital, which increases national output, also results in increased national wealth.

However, the widely used human resource concept in Africa and much of the developing world derives from the human development school. While acknowledging the importance of investments in health and education as advocated by the human resource theory, the human development school includes 'empowerment, cooperation, equity, sustainability and security as critical components needed to ensure the well-being of an individual'.⁵ For instance, the UNDP Human Development Report 1995 defines human

development as 'a process of enlarging people's choices such that people can lead a long and healthy life, acquire knowledge and have access to the resources they need to have a decent standard of living'.⁶ For the purpose of this chapter this definition will be used in the context of China-Africa cooperation in matters of human resource development in Africa.

In Philip Kotler et al's famous book entitled *The Marketing of Nations*, it is asserted that:

*The traditional quest of policymakers is to increase the amount of goods and services their nations produce. This type of thinking, however, could mean that many policymakers ignore factors that are critical to the long term health of their nations' economies.*⁷

According to the authors, four factors should be included in evaluating a nation's wealth:

- Natural Capital – the value of land, water, mineral timber and other natural resources
- Physical Capital – the value of machinery, buildings and public works
- Human Capital – the productive value of people
- Social Capital – the value of families, communities, and various organisations that provide the 'glue' in a society.⁸

Human capital development is one of the key drivers for any country's economic development. Africa is not an exception to this general rule, and according to their own understanding of Africa's developmental challenges, African leaders identified the lack of skilled human capital as a major factor. Africa, these leaders argued, ought to find ways to increase its human resource output as well as limit the exodus of its highly skilled population to developed countries.

In its study entitled 'The World Bank's Role in Human Resource Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Education, Training and Technical Assistance', the World Bank identified three major factors that impair the development of human resources in Africa:

- In the 1970s and 1990s Africa did not conserve its scarcest factor for production; human resource capital.
- Africa developed an education system along relatively high-cost lines.
- The operation of domestic and international labour markets.⁹

In explanation of the last point, note the following:

The operation of domestic and international labour markets for higher level skills has contributed to the persistence of shortages of these skills, despite the training that has occurred during the last three decades. On the one hand, civil service salary structures, combined with weak demand in the private sector during the past decade, have resulted in a serious deterioration in the real wages offered to Africans with higher level skills. On the other hand, technical assistance personnel are made available to governments at highly subsidised rates through foreign assistance programmes. The result has been that expatriates have sometimes been hired in place of Africans with comparative skills while the latter seek positions in the international markets. The net effect has been increased rather than decreased dependence on expatriates.¹⁰

Owing to endless conflicts, low incentives and poor infrastructure, Africa's medical doctors, nurses, engineers and other professionals go to developed countries in search of greener pastures. China is an example of a country that shared a similar challenge in rebuilding and reviving its human resources, and was able to bring itself to a sustainable developmental path. FOCAC therefore represents an important avenue for Africa to extract, discuss, review and customise this knowledge to suit its own socio-economic and political context. It is important to remember that China is one country, while Africa is a continent constituted of 53 unique countries with various levels of economic development, political stability, socio-economic status, and differing constitutional frameworks. While Africa presents a common position within FOCAC and other institutions through the AU, the actual implementation of lessons learned varies based on each country's capacity to do so.

Africa's human resource developmental challenges

In recent years, the world economy has accelerated its globalisation and all countries now face the challenge of adjusting to the new environment in order to benefit from the opportunities created. Africa is among the least prepared continents to face these new developments. Numerous causes underlie Africa's profound economic malaise, including low levels of development at the time of independence, poorly conceived policies, and a hostile international economic environment. However, the most fundamental

causes is Africa's severe lack of capacity. Despite some improvements in growth performance in some African countries, the majority of the states are still characterised by weak human and institutional capacity in formulating development projects and implementing strategic priorities and development programmes. The challenges and opportunities now facing African countries require that, developing capacities become the highest priority.¹¹

The development of human resources in both public and private sector organisations has become critical in an increasingly knowledge-based global economy.¹² In particular, human resource capacity building for public service delivery has been recognised by developed, transitional, and developing economies under the notion of the 'new public management' reform. In the context of new public management or public sector reform, decentralisation and human resource management and development have been recognised as crucial strategic policy elements in the implementation of reforms in both developed, transitional and developing countries.

Human resource development in Africa has always been linked to democratisation, as the virtues of democracy were touted as the key requirement for economic growth and sustainable development. In the 1980s, the World Bank and the IMF introduced the so-called Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). These enabled developing countries to borrow money via the World Bank, and despite huge national debt and high borrowing levels, money was given under certain conditions. SAPs focused on controlling inflation, controlling interest rates and money flow, and pruning public spending while building upon a economic policy of comparative advantage. For many developing countries, this led to fewer resources gained through public expenditure cuts to fund uniform comprehensive social services such as health funding.¹³

The SAP challenges were then followed by concerns in the 1990s of donor aid and its relevance to the continent. During this period, the role of aid in capacity development often came through technical assistance, which encompassed a range of activities designed to develop human resources through improvement in the level of skills, knowledge, and technical know-how for the purpose of improving development outcomes. With the Cold War being a thing of the past, donor fatigue had begun to sink in, buttressed by a self-examination whereby the West assessed the degree to which their aid was strengthening human resource capacity and institutional development in developing countries. One USAID White Paper noted in this regard: 'The strength and performance of resource skills, and institutions, particularly

as evidenced in the quality of governance and rule of law, are the primary determinants of development.¹⁴

Saassa questioned the relevance of donor aid through technical assistance, stating that

*in practice, the record of technical assistance has often not only been unsatisfactory. Perhaps the most disturbing is that after 40 years, 90% of the US\$12 billion a year in technical assistance is still spent on foreign expertise; despite the fact that national experts are now available in many fields. Often, poorly planned and monitored technical cooperation programmes rarely have clear criteria for assessing the existing technical capacity of recipient countries or for measuring and monitoring additional capacity building. Nor do they seem able to forecast how each country is expected to graduate from the need for technical assistance.*¹⁵

Saassa also argued that quite often permanent skills transfer does not happen owing to a host of factors, including:

- Technical assistance is often supply-driven, or imposed as a price for financial assistance rather than a response to local demands.
- Projects are over-designed, revealing limited appreciation of the virtues of ensuring local input and adaptation.
- Assistance to a country was sometimes specifically tied to foreign consultants/experts who were meant to transfer technical skills and knowledge.¹⁶

The human resource development initiative under FOCAC was established against the background of donor-driven agencies that had failed to promote capacity in Africa. FOCAC highlighted China's strong commitment to not only provide infrastructural aid, but also to foster human development, which meant that the African leaders had an alternative to the failed western developmental strategies. In essence, FOCAC was viewed as a response to a vacuum left behind by more traditional forms of developmental assistance from Africa's European and US counterparts.

Africa has welcomed the human resource development initiative under FOCAC because as a continent it identified with China's ability to rise out of poverty and increase the capacity of its human resources. Moreover, given China's Socialist and Communist tendencies, African governments also began to question whether or not the democratic model was the only key

to developmental success. Given the positive response towards the Chinese model for human resource development, the key issue thus becomes whether or not the AU and China can develop effective strategies to respond to the interlocking challenges of skills capacity which would produce more equitable results.

According to the AU, for regional integration to succeed, human resource development is a critical sector whose performance directly affects and even determines the quality and magnitude of Africa's development. The Second Decade for Education in Africa 2006–2015 policy document stresses how Africa should have the commitment to develop human resources, and impart appropriate skills, knowledge and attitudes. The document further states that

education forms the basis for developing innovation, science and technology in order to harness resources, industrialise, and participate in the global knowledge economy and for Africa to take its rightful place in the global community.¹⁷

As indicated earlier, this chapter focuses on the two pillars of healthcare and agriculture. From a healthcare perspective, Africa has enormous challenges to overcome if it is to meet the Millennium Developmental Goals (MDGs) relating to healthcare, by 2015. Two in three Africans have no access to essential services such as family planning, maternal healthcare, and HIV prevention and treatment. The AU/NEPAD healthcare strategy is set out in the AU Health Strategy 2007–2015. It is a health systems approach, through which improvements in healthcare and health status are expected to be delivered largely at the country level. Its objectives are:

- To facilitate the development of initiatives to strengthen national healthcare systems in member states by 2009.
- To facilitate stronger collaboration between the healthcare and other sectors to improve the socio-economic and political environment for improving healthcare.
- To facilitate the scaling up of healthcare interventions in member states, including through regional and intergovernmental bodies.¹⁸

In addressing agricultural development, the AU designed the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) which was established as part of NEPAD. CAADP was endorsed by the AU Assembly through the Maputo Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security in Africa in 2003.¹⁹

Under the CAADP's aegis, African governments, the RECs, agriculturists and other stakeholders established four continent-wide priorities for investment and action in agriculture, forestry, fisheries and livestock management. The following targets have been set for 2015:

- Establishment of dynamic agricultural markets within countries and between regions.
- Integration of farmers into the market economy and improved access to markets so that Africa becomes a net exporter of agriculture products.
- Achievement of a more equitable distribution of wealth; especially for rural populations, as evidenced through access to land, physical and financial resources, knowledge, information and technology.
- Africa as a strategic player in agricultural science and technology development.
- Practice of environmentally sound agricultural production methods.²⁰

During the past decade, Africa has made significant strides in certain areas of social and economic development. Overall, countries are intensifying their interventions to improve social development indicators across the continent, with a number having demonstrated their commitment in this direction by creating ministries specially dedicated to various areas of social development.

However, the general development crisis has not been fundamentally altered. African countries still rank low on any list measuring social development and economic activity despite the wealth of natural resources in the continent. In 2006, for example, 34 of the 50 nations on the UN list of least developed countries were in Africa, and the bottom 25 entries on the UN quality of life index are regularly filled by African nations.²¹ What then would be the best way for African countries to maximise FOCAC? It is questionable if the AU can effectively benefit from FOCAC human resource development programmes when the AU has not yet organised itself as a grouping under FOCAC.

China-Africa cooperation in the health and agriculture sectors

Since the 1950s there has been an increase in Sino-Africa relations, specifically regarding human resource development. To this extent, as of 2005 there were around 18 989 scholarships available to African students in China. The human resource cooperation that exists between China and

Africa exists on various levels, more specifically in dispatching teachers, supplying teaching and research equipment and facilities, and being involved in joint research.²² Alden, De Oliveira and Large, summarise the realities of Sino-Africa relations well in saying that the Chinese government's distinctive mode of conducting its relations with the continent – which might be broadly labelled Chinese exceptionalism – is founded in an historically-informed framework and reinforced by official contemporary rhetoric emphasising equality, mutual benefit, sovereignty and non-interference. It is given expression and codified in the language, framing and actual conduct of official state relations and is informed by a discourse of difference and similitude.

China as a power is categorically different to all previous external powers engaged in Africa and this difference is based fundamentally on its seminal experience as a developing country. As such, Chinese exceptionalism is a modality of engagement that will ensure mutual benefit and win-win outcomes at continental and bilateral levels; it will structure relations in such a way that they may remain asymmetrical in economic content, but equal in terms of recognition of economic gains and political standing (mutual respect and political equality). Chinese diplomacy has operated on a different basis from the more overtly hierarchical power relations of established external powers. It has been mostly successful to date, even to the point where external reactions have suggested that China is somehow immune to the prevailing forces of political and economic gravity in Africa.

At the Fifth Ministerial Conference of FOCAC in Beijing, China, on 19 July 2012, Chinese President Hu Jintao announced specific measures related to healthcare and agriculture.

1. China will support the African integration process and help Africa enhance its own capacity for overall development.
2. China will continue to increase assistance to Africa by bringing the benefits of development to the African people. China will build more agricultural technology demonstration centres to help African countries increase production capacity.²³ Moreover, China will implement the African Talents Programme to train 30 000 personnel in various sectors, offer 18 000 government scholarships and build cultural and vocational training facilities.
3. China will deepen medical and healthcare cooperation, send 1 500 medical personnel to Africa and continue carrying out the Brightness Action campaign to provide free treatment for cataract patients.

4. China will help African countries enhance capacity-building in meteorological infrastructure and forest protection and management.
5. China will also continue to carry out well-drilling and water supply projects in Africa to provide safe drinking water for the African people.

China advocates that these kind of measures promote its public diplomacy endeavours, which are to promote political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation, mutual learning through cultural exchanges, more exchanges and consultations on security issues and stronger cooperation in international affairs.

Health diplomacy under FOCAC

Global health diplomacy is part of the 'new diplomacy' agenda by which foreign policy, since the end of the Cold War, has expanded to embrace new issues, new actors and new processes. While the meaning of the term can be somewhat nebulous, two main perspectives can be observed. The first, more specifically described as 'medical diplomacy', advocates the use of healthcare as an instrument for furthering foreign policy goals.²⁴ The US\$ 63 billion, six-year Global Health Initiative under the Obama Administration fits within this approach, serving as a core part of what US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton calls the 'three Ds of smart power: defence, diplomacy and development'.²⁵

The export and training of doctors by Cuba, and NATO's Medical Stability Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, also frame global health diplomacy in this way. Indeed, the importance given to global health diplomacy appears to be rising, most notably among emerging economies. The deployment of hospital ships by China, to supplement a longstanding practice of sending medical teams to Africa and Asia, South Korea's commitment to double its aid to Africa by 2012, and India's strengthening engagement with global health initiatives, are recent examples. An understanding of how emerging economies are engaging in global health diplomacy tells us much about the changing nature of global leadership.²⁶

China's prominence in global health diplomacy can be understood in this context. Its effective combination of economic power and diplomatic acumen in addressing global health issues, offers lessons for other countries seeking to play a more prominent leadership role in the emerging world order. By the end of 2010, China had sent 17 000 medical workers to 48 African countries, treating 200 million patients, according to China's Ministry of Health. In 2009 alone, 1 324 medical professionals worked at 130 institutions in 57

developing countries. Of that number, more than 1 000 Chinese doctors were in 40 African countries, reports China Radio International.²⁷

It is important to note that healthcare challenges in Africa emerged since independence in the 1960s when most African countries inherited inadequate healthcare systems. As the economy began declining in 1970s and 1980s, healthcare crumbled. It was unable to cope with a growing population, poor infrastructure and more importantly the lack of skilled human resources. In 2006, the World Health Organisation (WHO) acknowledged the long held view by African scholars that the brain drain was hindering development in all sectors of African society.²⁸ The crisis in the health system was compounded by the spread of epidemic diseases such as HIV/Aids. The WHO 2006 report stated that of 57 countries, 36 in Sub-Saharan Africa are seriously affected by the lack of sufficient numbers of critical healthcare workers such as doctors, nurses, pharmacists, lab technologists, radiographers and others.²⁹

In order to help alleviate some of these challenges, from the early 1960s, Chinese medical teams started to engage with their African counterparts in projects on prevention and treatment of malaria. This was the beginning of a long relationship of China-Africa cooperation in the fields of medicine and health.

*Africa has the largest number of Chinese medical-worker teams. The first was sent at the request of the Algerian government in April 1963. Since then, China has successively dispatched medical workers up to 15 000 times to 47 African countries.*³⁰

FOCAC III also pledged to expand Chinese support for scholarships for African students studying in China, education and agricultural aid, including Chinese technical assistance. Aid is one area in which China looks set to expand, not merely to enhance its interests, but also to further claims to leadership and demonstrate constructive contributions to human development beyond narrowly extractive or profit-oriented activities. In recent years China has supported humanitarian aid, conflict resolution and peacekeeping in Africa as part of an apparent emerging and increasingly prominent role as humanitarian donor and development force. Aid can also finance vehicles – such as patrol boats provided to Sierra Leone and to Mauritius – equipment or material goods in general, and even on uncommon occasions, direct budgetary support.³¹ Chinese infrastructural aid and development is coupled by humanitarian aid that is desperately

needed on the African continent.

Another aspect of the Chinese medical assistance programme is that Chinese companies have begun to sponsor medical missions themselves. The first large-scale private charity mission sponsored by Chinese companies doing business in Africa, took place in 2010. It was called ‘an important step in Chinese companies’ reward for African people’, in a press release from HNA Group, a Chinese company that was involved in the project. Called the 2010 China-Africa Brightness Action, Anhui Foreign Economic Construction (Group) and the HNA Group, along with the Beijing Tongren Hospital, sent more than 20 medical personnel on a chartered flight to Malawi and Zimbabwe to perform 1 000 cataract surgeries in one week.

Moreover – though Africa has had to depend on foreign countries to alleviate some of its dire healthcare issues – China may be the only country to send government-paid medical workers to work and stay in Africa for extended periods of time. That level of commitment has proven to be an important facet of its soft power foreign policy strategy. Many other medical organisations working in Africa are sponsored by charities or private groups, not governments.³²

Needless to say, China’s health diplomacy has offered much-needed medical aid to African countries for over 50 years as a soft power strategy to strengthen bonds with African governments. As indicated earlier, it is not just China that has been implementing health diplomacy as a soft power tactic. The US and other governments have also engaged in this process. What is critical to note is the fact that the Chinese government has managed to promote human resource capacity in the health sector without the typical donor-driven tendencies of focusing on experts and technical consultants who are not necessarily aligned to the grass roots level.

AU agriculture development challenges and FOCAC

Agriculture remains key to reducing poverty in Africa. Nearly 80% of the population in Sub-Saharan Africa live in rural areas and 70% of this rural population are dependent on food production through farming or livestock keeping for most of their livelihood.³³ The agricultural sector in Africa accounts for more than 60% of employment, 20% of total exports and 17% of GDP. More than 90% of the continent’s food supply is produced by small-holding farmers in rural areas. Yet, more than 50% of the food- insecure populations are small-holding farmers, in addition to the landless poor and the urban poor.³⁴

The challenges of improved productivity and profitability are not easily addressed. The underdeveloped agricultural sector is characterised by poor farmers who are risk averse and do not have resources to invest in new technologies. There is an over-reliance on primary agriculture often practised on soils with low fertility and subject to environmental degradation. About 95% of African agriculture is rain fed, thus making food production vulnerable to adverse weather patterns. Barriers to market access and penetration, such as poor market infrastructure and roads, lack of information, inadequate policies, insufficient extension services and a lack of consistent market and phyto-sanitary standards increase the levels of producer risk.³⁵ With few resources to counter the risk, producers generally rely on traditional methods of production and risk mitigation strategies, such as small-scale diversification, low-cost inputs, low input agriculture and marketing products at the farm-gate. Agriculture ministries in most of the regional economic communities need further capacity enhancement to accelerate progress.³⁶

Achieving the required increases in productivity will require sustained improvements in human and institutional capacity and policies that encourage innovation in all aspects of agriculture and related industries and services. Recent years have seen renewed support for the sector, including the aforementioned Maputo Declaration of 2003, which committed African governments to allocate 10% of their national budgets to agriculture with the aim of raising annual agricultural growth rates to 6%.³⁷ The role of FOCAC in the continental developmental agenda is significant because the sector's highly fragmented aid architecture requires regional players to establish a well-coordinated division of labour, based on respective areas of comparative advantage, specialisation and track record.³⁸

Unfortunately, there has so far been a lack of vision and a coherent, widely agreed policy framework. Bold leadership and political will are both needed to address this policy gap. At the level of country strategies and programmes, performance was found to be weak in both organisations, especially in terms of relevance to country needs, as well as regarding to policy dialogue, knowledge management, and partnership building.

Spreading agricultural development in Africa is not a soft power tactic that has only been utilised by China. Agricultural growth has been one of the US's top soft power achievements of diplomacy and international relations over the decades. Beginning with the Marshall Plan and the Green Revolution, the Obama Administration's Feed the Future initiative continues this lineage. According to Thurow, Feed the Future is a key part of

the US government's effort to reduce global hunger and improve global food security by reversing the neglect of international agricultural development over the past several decades. Feed the Future also stresses the importance of partnerships with the private sector and the governments of developing countries as well as with universities, foundations and humanitarian organisations. These partnerships were vital to the success of the Green Revolution 50 years ago. Feed the Future now wants to emphasise long-term agricultural development – rather than solely focusing on short-term emergency food aid relief – and focus on the small-holding farmers of the developing world. This means facilitating access to the essential elements of farming – seeds, soil nutrients, training and micro-financing – so that the small-holding farmers can be as productive as possible.

China leads the world in the output of grain as well as a number of other agricultural products.³⁹ China's quick turnaround in the agricultural sector can be explained by its various government interventions. Among these was a rural development strategy that shifted from the collectives to emphasising the importance of farming by individual family households in 1980s. China's rural development experience as an emerging market, has given significant hope to African leaders. In 2006, China pledged to train 15 000 African professionals, send 100 senior agricultural experts to Africa, set up 10 special agricultural technology demonstration centres in Africa, build 100 rural schools, and increase the number of Chinese government scholarships to African students from 2 000 per year to 4 000 per year by 2009. Around 1 100 students from 46 African countries were studying in China in 2006.⁴⁰

In order for the FOCAC measures to work, providing farmers with support to make their farming systems more productive, more sustainable and more resilient, is essential. Using resources efficiently and adapting to the effects of climate change will be the hallmarks of smart farming in the coming decades. As such, the human resource development initiative must acknowledge that a more productive, sustainable and resilient form of agriculture is knowledge-intensive, which requires small-holding farmers to develop new skills and capacities. Their access to education and training must be expanded, and these must be adapted to rural needs and focus on young people in particular.⁴¹

Conclusion

The inaugural White Paper on China's strategy towards Africa stresses the fact that the Sino-African strategic partnership is based on 'equal treatment, respect for sovereignty and common development'.⁴² Beijing has effectively used FOCAC as a vehicle to articulate its White Paper policy road map for cooperation with Africa. This approach has effectively allowed China to set the rules of engagement at FOCAC.⁴³ However, the responses by African governments to China's human resource development initiatives on the continent have often been reactive, uncoordinated and ad hoc. This has caused African countries to undermine their own interests.

There has also been international concerns regarding the reasons behind China's aid under FOCAC. Brautigam argues that all aid has a diplomatic component. She states that the mutual benefits and aid assistance are all tied to Chinese companies and getting businesses started to foster Chinese exports thereby promoting their soft power strategy. Moreover, medical aid or aid in any other form, is a vital component of China's soft power strategy in Africa. It has demonstrated itself as a very influential tool to pave the way for Chinese businesses to expand in one of the most potentially lucrative markets in the world.⁴⁴

Though China's new-found relationship with Africa is based on fostering new markets for economic growth, it bears a resemblance to the relationship that the US and Europe has had with the continent since post-independence. Yet China's relationship with the continent is based on the idea of mutual respect; something that has been absent from Euro-African and US-Africa relations for decades. China is unique among donors in having a mechanism like FOCAC that deals with virtually the whole of Africa. Unlike many traditional donors such as France and Britain, it does not cooperate principally with a special subset of countries with historic, linguistic, geographic or economic ties with the donor country. China also seeks to avoid these FOCAC engagements appearing like aid or development assistance. They are rather presented as elements of a joint agreement between two partners, featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchanges which are a key feature of their public diplomacy. In conclusion, the healthcare and agricultural initiatives under FOCAC are a much needed source of assistance by African countries, and it is up to the African leaders to craft a collective bargaining strategy to shape the Sino-African relationship in a way that will be beneficial to the continent's human resource development.

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CHAPTER THREE

Dissecting soft power and Sino-Africa relations in education and exchanges cooperation

Li Baoping and Luo Jianbo

Introduction

The twenty-first century witnessed the beginning of a new phase of educational cooperation between China and the African continent. Marked by the first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in October 2000, the cooperation became more institutionalised. It was during this meeting that states jointly signed the Beijing Declaration of 2000, and issued the Programme for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development. Within this programme, ministers agreed to expand cooperation in education and human resources development, while the Chinese pledged to approve more scholarships and send more teachers to Africa as well as increase its financial contribution. Another significant development was that the two sides agreed to work out country-specific training plans through appropriate channels, identify specific cooperation projects and facilitate their implementation, all of which laid the foundation for further cooperation.¹

At the recent 2012 FOCAC V meeting, both China and Africa made it clear that cooperation of a higher quality and in more diverse forms on education, had been conducted between China and Africa since FOCAC IV. The two sides agreed to attach more importance to cooperation in education and push for new progress. According to the FOCAC V measures, the two sides will continue to implement the 20+20 Cooperation Plan for Chinese and African Institutions of Higher Education, improve the cooperation mechanism between Chinese and African institutions of higher education, encourage Chinese and African universities to increase cooperation in regional and country studies and support African universities in establishing China research centres.²

FOCAC V also indicates that China will provide US\$ 2 million annually

under the framework of the UNESCO trust fund to support education development programmes in Africa, in particular higher education. China will also continue to help African countries build educational and training facilities and provide more opportunities for short, medium and long-term training and scholarships. From a cultural perspective, the two regions will continue to promote the establishment and development of the Confucius Institute and Confucius Classrooms in Africa. China will extend active support in terms of teaching staff, personnel training and teaching materials and equipment.³

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Ministers in charge of economic cooperation of the People's Republic of China and 50 African countries and the Chairperson of the African Union (AU) Commission, also pledged to continue to strengthen people-to-people and cultural exchanges and cooperation between the two regions. They indicated that they will vigorously carry out the dialogue between Chinese and African civilisations, launch a new round of exchanges in culture, education, sports, tourism and other fields, and forge closer ties between the young people, women, non-governmental organisations, media organisations and academic institutions, with a view to deepening the understanding and friendship between the peoples of China and Africa and promoting the diversity of world civilisations.⁴

The FOCAC measures to promote people-to-people exchanges, higher education and training speak of international cooperation between the two regions. International cooperation and volunteerism through education was initially established post-WWII, and have been typically premised on a clear political and cultural mandate as a tool of soft power.⁵ Higher education is seen as positive public goods to domestic populations that contribute to a country's knowledge capability.⁶ On an individual level, resources can be defined as the prestige of attending Chinese tertiary institutions, i.e. social legitimacy is derived from attending and graduating from these universities in the domestic social context. The prestige of social acceptance value in attaining these public goods is objectified as cultural capital (symbolic capital) and a measure of social capital of institutionalised credit, which graduates as individuals carry with them when they enter social systems.⁷

Joseph Nye formulated his thesis and understanding of soft power in the early 1990s as a means of juxtaposing the use of military or coercive power against a more nuanced use of cultural implantation of power. This typology of power is critical when evaluating education and its value transfer

capacity. Criteria for formulating a model of soft power usage as formulated by Nye should first consist of a reason and intent of the actor in question, second, a policy vehicle, and third, a medium of exchange so as to promote the interests and intent of the actor in question.⁸ Soft power is inherently elusive and should be viewed through the lens of legitimacy in order to capture a conceptual analysis, as argued by Cooper who sees legitimacy as being at the core of soft power and associated behaviours.⁹ This chapter maintains that higher education and people-to-people exchange – as a legitimate and valued public good both from a developmental level as well as from an individual to social perspective – is the generator of soft power and will drive China foreign policy in higher education.

The fact is that education cooperation has been a successful aspect of FOCAC as China and Africa have built a number of platforms to facilitate such exchanges, including the Chinese/African ‘Culture in Focus’, Joint Research and Exchange Programme, People’s Forum and Think Tanks Forum.¹⁰ The multidimensional and increasingly global nature of international education presents enormous opportunity for vital exchange and interactions between students, academics and communities. Positive experiences of exchange and the development of intellectual, commercial and social relationships can build a nation’s reputation and enhance the ability of that nation to participate in and influence regional or global outcomes, which is ultimately the essence of soft power.

For China, however, the soft power inherent in international education is yet to be fully realised. In the case of China’s volunteer programmes, there is room for more active public diplomacy leadership among the government ministries, improved evaluation and expanded dialogue both with the government sector and the civil society sector. Such strategies would maximise the soft power potential of China’s international education, and contribute to China’s future international positioning.

This chapter examines how international education under FOCAC can serve as a tool of public diplomacy, and is divided into four sections. The first section serves as introduction. The second section establishes the framework of FOCAC as a soft power tool from a Chinese foreign policy perspective. The third section provides information related to educational cooperation including some basic challenges that need to be addressed. This section also focuses on the impact of volunteerism on China’s foreign policy image. Volunteerism for the purpose of this chapter, is defined as the use of, or reliance on volunteers, specifically to perform social or educational work in communities. The fourth and concluding section identifies potential

opportunities under FOCAC for developing a public diplomacy view of international education that will maximise China's soft power.

FOCAC as a soft power imperative

Chinese soft power can be a positive force multiplier that contributes to peace and stability in Africa and thus provide Beijing an opportunity to reset the direction of its foreign policy in general. China's rising economic, political and military power is the most geopolitically significant development of this century. Joshua Kurlantzick defines soft power as 'anything outside the military and security realm, including not only popular culture and public diplomacy, but also more coercive economic and diplomatic levers like aid and investment and participation in multilateral organisations'.¹¹ Some Chinese commentators argue that it is an area where China may enjoy some advantages similar to the US. These strategists advocate spreading appreciation of Chinese culture and values through educational and exchange programmes such as the Confucius Institutes. This approach, they argue, would draw on the attractiveness of China's developmental model and assistance programmes, which include economic aid and investment, and human resource development.

In an influential article entitled 'Cultural Expansion and Cultural Sovereignty', Wang Huning, a member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee Secretariat and political adviser to former Chinese president Jiang Zemin, argued that Beijing should more deeply imbed and infuse Chinese culture, – i.e., traditional Chinese and Confucian values – into its foreign policy.¹² Furthermore, the political report of the 16th CCP Congress points out that 'in today's world, culture intertwines with economics and politics, demonstrating a more prominent position and role in the competition for comprehensive national power'.¹³ The Chinese government often advertises its soft power through its several official documents and policies by using phrases like 'friendly and good neighbourly' (*mu lin youhao*), 'benevolence towards and partnerships with neighbours' (*yi lin wei shan, yu lin wei ban*) and 'enrich, harmonise and reassure the neighbourhood' (*fu lin, mu lin, an lin*).¹⁴ Subsequently, in January 2006, Chinese President Hu Jintao told the Central Foreign Affairs Leadership Group that the increase in China's international reputation and status 'will have to be demonstrated in hard power such as the economy, science and technology, and defense, as well as in soft power such as culture'.¹⁵

It is against this background that China's diplomacy has been viewed as refreshingly different. Instead of lecturing African countries on good governance in 'hard power language' – i.e. threats and ultimatums, which was the norm – China has been utilising the 'gentle language' of mutually beneficial development cooperation and political dialogue in its discourse with African countries. As Mulitka indicates, China deploys soft power in Africa very prudently. In 2000, the Peoples' Republic of China and the AU established a strategic partnership entitled the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). Apart from formalising a forum for China's leaders to deepen economic and other forms of cooperation with leaders of 54 African countries, FOCAC offers a platform for frank dialogue between the two regions to examine points of friction and difficulty in the strategic partnership. African attendance at FOCAC meetings has been high, with at least 40 African Heads of State present. Moreover, through the FOCAC framework, a regular forum for Chinese and African think tanks has been established to offer concrete proposals to FOCAC to deepen China-Africa diplomatic ties.¹⁶

The FOCAC meetings have confirmed the China-Africa relationship as the apogee of South-South cooperation in a rapidly globalising international system. The South-South agenda is to be advanced through solidarity in international organisations and an expanded Africa-Asia dialogue. China has pledged support in advancing Africa's agenda, including encouraging the industrialised nations to fulfil development promises to bring Africa in line with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the conclusion of the Doha World Trade negotiations and better representation for Africa in the global arena. China has undertaken to support African unity via the AU, African regional integration efforts and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) development programme. Apart from trade and investment, China has also become a key human resource development donor in Africa. The urgency and commitment displayed by Chinese corporations have impressed their African hosts and injected a new dynamism into Africa's commercial processes.¹⁷

Africa's perception of China has been shaped by China's historical commitment to Africa's freedom struggles. A strong sentiment of liberation solidarity underpins the relationship. China's successful development model – grounded in strong state management of economic liberalisation and development – holds wide appeal in Africa, where states are seeking to escape the poverty trap. A central element of the China-Africa relationship is the principle of equal rights and mutual respect through which Africa can

negotiate with China as an equal, seeking mutually beneficial outcomes. Political conditions demanded by Western donor nations do not feature in China's African intervention. Instead, the focus is on practical, realistic and achievable objectives based on a common development agenda.

China's commitment to develop Africa's infrastructure and further educational, agricultural and economic development, is interpreted as proof of China's intentions to assist Africa over the longer term, rather than simply to seek an exploitative relationship based on oil and mineral extraction. African states have been quick to respond to China's fresh approach, and agreements have been concluded on a wide range of aspects.¹⁸ The reaffirmations in the 2012 FOCAC Declaration mentioned earlier demonstrate to some level FOCAC's soft power achievements from a Chinese perspective.

An assessment of educational cooperation under FOCAC

According to the latest statistics of the Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China, since September 2007, China accepted around 21 000 students with Chinese government scholarships, while approximately 8 000 African students study in China at their own expense. During the past five years, the number of African students in China has increased tremendously with an annual growth rate of around 20%.¹⁹ Furthermore, China has now become the main destination country for African students and accepted the largest number of African students in Asia to date.

There are several reasons why China has become an educational attraction. First, China has maintained sustainable and rapid economic development, and further raised its international standing, and established stable relationships with African countries. Secondly, the gradual increase of higher education quality in China has won recognition worldwide. Since 2002, there have been great breakthroughs in the mutual recognition of education qualifications in China and other countries. China has signed agreements on mutual recognition of educational qualifications with more than 32 countries, including Germany, Britain, and France. Thirdly, the number and variety of scholarships provided by China has increased. Other than the scholarships provided by the Chinese central government, many local governments, such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Chongqing also established local government scholarships, some universities established their own scholarships and some enterprises also established scholarships

for foreign students in China. Fourthly, the Chinese study environment for foreign students is attractive from an economic point of view. The general consumption level in China is relatively low, hence the cost of studying and living in China is much less than it would be in Western countries.

Among all the African students studying in China, about 50% are Bachelor candidates and 50% are M.A. candidates. Taking 2007 as an example, M.A. candidates and PhD candidates accounted for 57.3% of all African students in China. Moreover, the study areas for African students have expanded from the traditional subjects such as Agriculture, Medicine and Languages to include Education, Economy, Management, and International Politics. The only African countries that haven't obtained scholarships from the Chinese government are: Swaziland, Burkina Faso, Sao Tome and Principe.²⁰

Most of the African students who have finished their studies in China have gone on to occupy high career posts in their respective countries. For example, Mr Charles Phiri who studied technology engineering at Beijing Jiaotong University, has been working as the Managing Director of TAZARA (Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority) for several years. Besides Mr Phiri, more than 270 African students who graduated in China, have been working for TAZARA, and several of them occupy middle-level or high posts.

Besides the long-term university degree training, there have also been other methods of international education implemented, such as professional training where institutions such as the Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Culture and All-China Women's Federation have held special seminars for African professionals in China, that last for about a month. To date, China has trained at least 20 916 African officials and technicians.²¹ It is important to note that the China-Africa education cooperation has now formed an independent developing system which combines leadership and coordination from government with active participation of universities and academic sectors. The domestic universities have implemented several Africa studies related programmes at institutions such as the Peking University Centre for Africa Studies, Zhejiang Normal University Centre for African Education Studies, and the Tianjin University of Technology and Education Centre for African Vocational Education Studies.

Then there is the 'teachers in aid' programme where Chinese teachers go to Africa and disseminate knowledge production directly. From 1956 until to date, China has sent more than 500 specialised teachers to 35 African

countries, who gave courses in more than 10 subjects and specialties, including Science, Engineering, Agriculture, Arts and Physical Training.²² During the late 1980s, China launched the Advanced Education and Scientific Research Programme, mainly aimed at: donating teaching and scientific research equipment to African universities; Chinese teachers to aid Africa in doing scientific research together with the local university teachers and scientific researchers; selecting young teachers and people dealing with scientific research or technologies to attend advanced studies in China. From 1995 until recently, China implemented 43 sessions of the Advanced Education and Scientific Research Programme in 21 African countries successively, and facilitated 21 comparatively advanced laboratories in the fields of biology, micro-biology, computer science, physics, analytical chemistry, food refreshment and processing at various African universities.

The dawn of the 21st century also afforded China the opportunity to utilise its teachers to promote its culture through language as Confucius Institutes were established on the continent. Currently, there are a total of 21 Confucius Institutes in 14 African countries.²³ The Chinese government actively supports these programmes by donating a large number of Chinese textbooks as well as language equipment and providing Chinese teachers.

Despite the limited amount of investment for teaching in Africa compared to the West, China has been effective in promoting international education with Chinese characteristics. Many Chinese teachers have been actively involved with African local governments, and promoted locally-based research for the communities they reside in. For example, Zhejiang Agricultural University – which has merged with Zhejiang University – sent 12 professors to work in Cameroon where they established a micro-biology laboratory at No.1 University of Yaounde, which cost RMB 2 million.²⁴

However, despite all the impressive strides in international education, there are some challenges hampering this process from developing to its full potential. Firstly, the education cooperation exchange process is skewed, as China seldom sends its students and scholars abroad to study and do research, and there are even fewer African scholars travelling to give lectures in China. On the one hand, China's intelligence support to aid Africa is based on mutual communication, on the other hand, China does not invest much in developing China-Africa experts. China's political and commercial success in the world is dependent on future decision-makers from African countries having a better understanding of and closer ties with China. An in-depth knowledge of Africa would promote the emergence of Chinese experts in African affairs. Needless to say, there are

also African values and ideals that China can import in order to have a better understanding of the continent. In terms of research opportunities, there is a lot of indigenous knowledge and advanced technologies – such as medical and surgical techniques and mining techniques – in Africa which are worth learning. It is on this basis that the need for FOCAC VI to rectify the unbalanced exchange process in China-Africa education cooperation, is emphasised.

Secondly, there is a serious deficiency in the coordination among ministries and commissions concerning China-Africa education cooperation, which is weakening its performance and effect. These challenges have to do with structure. (It is important at this juncture to clarify that I am one of the China-Africa education cooperation recipients. The programme I attended in Tanzania in 2003 was part of the cooperation between the Ministries of Education of both China and Tanzania. The then cultural counsellor Mr Qiu Bingjun was in Tanzania at the time and during his four-year term, China and Tanzania made such progress in education cooperation that it could be considered as a model for incorporation. Currently, the Ministry of Education has only delegated one official to oversee education-related affairs, based at the Chinese Embassy in South Africa. The ministry hasn't assigned specific people in this area, to the embassies in the other 48 countries which have diplomatic relations with China. Similar appointments would ensure that the education division is not just taken over by cultural counsellors or others.²⁵

The fact is that the mandate of cultural counsellors is determined by the Chinese Ministry of Culture which is usually related to art performances, exhibitions and art development, and not connected to education. According to 8 cultural counsellors I have interviewed²⁶ in 2009, issues related to education cooperation were beyond their responsibilities, meaning that the cultural counsellor would elect whether or not to invest any efforts in international education. If the cultural counsellor was not interested in international education – which was sometimes the case – this would lead to complaints and dissatisfaction about the processes by the African stakeholders. The other unfortunate aspect about this process was that the resources expended by the government on educational exchanges were either being wasted, or not put to good use. Consequently, one could argue that education cooperation programmes in some countries are basically misplaced, thereby undermining China's foreign policy objectives.

The inefficiency of educational cooperation stems from Beijing at the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs. Possibly, these ministries should consolidate their resources, which would promote efficiency and productivity. Some scholars have suggested the setting up of a high-level organ authorised to take charge of the general direction of educational aid to Africa. The responsibilities of this organ would be to provide the central government and other relevant functional sections with suggestions or support on mid- or long-term policy regarding educational aid, directing and coordinating the work of Africa studies, education training which would improve the objectives of education cooperation.²⁷

The final deficiency or challenge deals with the sphere of volunteerism. China officially began to send its volunteers to Africa in 2004. The first group of volunteers was made up of Chinese teachers who went to Mauritius in October that year. As part of the Volunteer Programme for International Chinese Teachers of the Office of Chinese Language Council, those volunteers would teach Chinese in Mauritius to children aged five to twelve at the government-run primary schools for one year. The volunteer programme has spread to six countries and is run by the Young Volunteers Action Guiding Centre under the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League of China under the Ministry of Commerce, and is part of the China Youth Volunteers Services.²⁸

The US was the first country to send volunteers to Africa in 1961 when the first Peace Corps Volunteers accepted assignments to serve the Republics of Ghana and Tanganyika. More than 182 000 men and women have served in 138 countries, and currently the Peace Corps Volunteers are serving in 71 countries in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Central and South America, Europe, and the Middle East, but Sub-Saharan Africa remains their main destination. The Peace Corps were set up in the 1960s as a strategy to meet the political needs related to the Cold War era. The programme developed from American philanthropic traditions, and is based on humanitarianism. The volunteers have been teachers and mentors to countless children, helped farmers to grow crops, worked with small businesses to market products, and shown women how to better care for their children. More recently, they have helped schools develop computer skills and educated the entire community about HIV/Aids.

Because the Peace Corps volunteers mainly work at grass root level in the countries, they present the first impression of American people and the US among the local people they assist. The US Ambassador to the Republic of Guinea once wrote to US Department of State that

*the real US Ambassadors are those volunteers rather than those who are in the Embassy in the capital city. In fact, most of the people on the continent get ideas about the US and its people through their observation of the volunteers.*²⁹

The generosity and dedication of volunteers win trust and build friendship for the US wherever they go, and this helps to improve America's image in those countries. Furthermore, it enhances the attraction to the outside world, which serves America's diplomatic strategy and national interests.³⁰

Volunteers' service is an important means of spreading abroad the culture and values of their home country. Since culture is an element of soft power, China shouldn't ignore its strengths and influences in foreign policies and diplomatic activities. Still using the Peace Corps as an example; where most of the volunteers work as English teachers, the language not only became known as a learning tool, but also as a culture carrier, ensuring that the American value system and public culture spread throughout Africa. Most importantly, the people who are usually taught by the volunteers sometimes end up as future leaders of the host countries. Currently, there have already been some cabinet ministers, envoys, leaders in enterprises and trading organisations who once were taught by Peace Corps volunteers, including the incumbent Vice President of the Republic of Ghana. Those leaders who were taught in the American way, are now influencing or even determining some of the critical decisions of their countries.³¹

A cultural tendency among Chinese to want to volunteer, has also developed. Non-governmental volunteerism to Africa took place earlier than that of governmental participation. Typically, the volunteers go to work in Africa through the arrangement of civil and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs). For example, Li Haibao, a senior student at Beijing Forestry University was assigned by the Development Aid from People to People (DAPP), an NGO with its headquarters in Denmark, to teach in Namibia for six months in 1998. His work mainly consisted of supervising the operation of local kindergardens, training the teachers and teaching the children English. To date, this NGO has sent about 100 volunteers from China to serve in African countries.³²

If the government could effectively intervene in the volunteer programme and arrange volunteerism in Africa, this process would become more attractive for graduating students. The recognition and support by the government is also indispensable to achieve effective results. In China, the central budget supports the volunteers' overseas services. However, apart

from providing financial support, it is essential for the government to take over general coordination through ministries such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education.

As indicated earlier, in the West, overseas voluntary service is much more guided and supported by government rather than a civilian activity which is self-motivated. It is essential that China starts following the same trend of a guided policy application for volunteers. The African Policy Paper issued in 2006 declared that

*China will encourage and facilitate the exchanges between people's organisations of China and Africa, especially the youth and women, with a view to increasing the understanding, trust and cooperation of people on both sides. It will encourage and guide Chinese volunteers to serve in African countries.*³³

It is time that the volunteer process is properly implemented as it could establish a new component to China's policies towards Africa, as well as increase China-Africa education cooperation.

Conclusion

There is growing support within FOCAC regarding human resource development at higher education level and through voluntary teaching mechanisms. The mushrooming of Confucius Institutes, a high number of African students travelling to China instead of Western countries, the high rate of professional training, and the developing trend of think tank exchanges and partnerships, all illustrate that the ongoing success of this public diplomacy requires government to reframe and coordinate these efforts within the framework of China's foreign policy. Given that the primary objective of public diplomacy is to influence foreign public's opinion in a way that supports a country's national interest,³⁴ the vehicle utilised should appropriately engage the measures identified under FOCAC while at the same time delivering the underpinning principles of soft power.

The FOCAC framework has operated as a uniquely Pan-African modality for relating to Africa, and within that, there has been a series of human resource development, cultural, education and training commitments implemented within most African countries. The high priority and committed implementation of all the educational programmes under FOCAC is a substantial diplomatic achievement. Needless to say, the challenge of distributing all these varied offers across an enormous variety of African

contexts must be huge, and involve staff in many Chinese and African ministries, host universities in China, as well as both the political and economic and commercial branches of all of China's African embassies. It is also important to note that China's engagement with the continent has been largely welcomed by African governments, particularly because of its different approach from the West. However, there is still room in the current FOCAC measures where the value of China's international education engagements might be maximised, creating win-win objectives that will enhance China's regional and global future positioning.

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CHAPTER FOUR

Sino-Africa dynamics of joint knowledge production: prospects and challenges

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Introduction

The fourth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC IV) in Egypt established a platform for Sino-African cooperation among think tanks. At that forum, Premier Wen Jiabao proposed the launch of a China-Africa joint research and exchange programme which would enable scholars and think tanks to increase exchanges and cooperation, share development experiences, and provide intellectual support for formulating improved cooperation policies between the two sides. Since the 1970s and 1980s, scientific collaborations between regions have become common practice, particularly between the North and the South. South-South research initiatives such as the FOCAC think tank exchange programme is a growing phenomenon which can provide shared opportunities for capacity building and knowledge production on the continent.

Knowledge production is considered one of the main priorities on the reform agenda for industrial growth and sustainable development strategies internationally, as well as on the African continent. However, most African countries have yet to transform their national developmental pledges into feasible programmes for science-led development. Africa currently accounts for a negligible share of global industrial output and manufactured exports. Only in a few of the countries is the manufacturing value added/GDP ratio above 20%. That Africa remains the poorest region of the world, where 34 of the 50 least developed countries are located and in which poverty is on the increase, is a reflection of its low level of industrialisation and its marginalisation in global manufacturing.

There exists a strong linkage between industrial productive capacity, economic growth and level of development.¹ Africa requires an acceleration of industrial development and diversification of the economy to meet the

challenges of development and achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as well as the socio-economic objectives of the African Union (AU). International experience has shown that the key to realising sustainable economic development lies in its level of scientific and technological innovation.

The research development gap between Africa and the rest of the world has grown. While other regions are constantly upgrading their technologies, Africa is failing to keep up. Some economists feel that this widening gap is partly responsible for the continent's underdevelopment. Sub-Saharan Africa contributes about 2.3% of world GDP, but is responsible for only 0.4% of global expenditure in research and development (R&D).² With 13.4% of the world's population, the continent is home to only 1.1% of the world's scientific researchers. It has about one scientist or engineer per 10 000 people, compared with 20–50 scientists or engineers per 10 000 people in industrial nations.³

In China, rapid economic development has been buttressed by knowledge production. After WWII, China adopted a development strategy that included deliberate insulation from the world economy, industrialisation and the economic dominance of the state. In 2007, at the 17th Communist Party of China (CPC) National Congress, the Scientific Outlook on Development concept was stressed as an important guiding principle for social and economic development, and a major strategic theory that must be upheld in applying 'developing socialism' with Chinese characteristics.⁴ According to Yingkui, the Scientific Outlook theory takes development as its overriding priority. From a development perspective on both the ideological and practical levels, it requires the Chinese nation to find solutions to the problems encountered in the process of development and seize opportunities to achieve development and modernisation as quickly as possible.

By 2010, China ranked second worldwide in industrial output. While the US still has a bigger share of the global R&D market, second-ranked China is gaining ground.⁵ China's specific inclusion of R&D in its industrial growth and recently in its national planning documents has paid off significantly. China's Special Economic Zones⁶ are rapidly turning China into one of the world's top countries in terms of attracting Foreign Direct Investment. According to the CIA World Fact book, China ranked second in the world in terms of its GDP with its Purchasing Power Parity at 10,119,896. The US ranked first at 14,526,550.⁷ A quick glance at international research investment as detailed in Table 1 below demonstrates an urgent need for African countries to establish and invest in their own Scientific Outlook on

Development theory that can be infused into continental industrial growth and development.

Table 1: International Research Investment

Country/ Region	GERD per Researcher @ 1000 PPPs in 2002	GERD per Researcher @ 1000 PPPs in 2007	Researchers per million inhabitants in 2002	Researchers per million inhabitants in 2007
North America	204.8	251.0	4 527.3	4 654.3
European Union	176.1	194.7	2 420.3	2 727.7
Japan	167.3	207.9	5 071.6	5 548.1
China	487.7	73.7	629.1	1 071.3
Sub-Saharan countries	57.1	64.1	51.3	60.3

(World Bank Table: 2009. GERD represents Gross, Annual Expenditure on Research Production and Development. PPP represents Purchasing Power Parity)

China is well-suited to becoming a collaborating partner with Africa on the academic exchange programme because of its vested interests in this area. The African continent's research investment is problematic with its gross and annual expenditure on research production and development at only 57.1. In order for the China-Africa joint research and exchange programme to become an effective tool of continental industrial development, constraints and economic disparities driving research capacity will need to be considered.

Since the FOCAC IV took place in 2009, a lot of activity has followed. For example, in October 2011, the first conference of the China-Africa think tank forum was held in Hangzhou and Jinhua, Zhejiang Province, where the think tank forum was officially incorporated into the FOCAC framework by China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Based on the 2011 incorporation, regular mechanisms for academics between China and Africa, the forum will be held in China and Africa alternatively once every year. In a move to further strengthen the China-Africa think tank forum, the FOCAC V Beijing Action Plan 2013–2015 emphasised the following regarding exchanges between academia and think tanks:

The two sides noted with satisfaction that the China-Africa joint research and exchange plan has been successfully launched and implemented, which has effectively strengthened cooperation and exchanges between scholars and think tanks of the two sides and provided strong intellectual support to China-Africa cooperation.⁸

Moreover, the two sides agreed to continue to implement the plan and decided to:

- Sponsor 100 programmes by academic institutions and scholars of the two sides in the next three years covering topical research, international symposiums, mutual visits of scholars and publication of works.
- Propose to implement the China-Africa Think Tanks 10+10 Partnership Plan to select ten Chinese think tanks and ten think tanks from African countries to establish long-term paired cooperation relationships.
- Encourage and support scholars of the two sides to conduct joint research and publish the results of their joint research in international academic journals and other publications.⁹

Given the extensive progress that has been made since the past four years, this chapter examines some of the challenges and prospects of the FOCAC think tank collaboration, particularly from Africa's side. Some of these challenges are: the impact of the brain drain syndrome, limited political will from African governments, policy transfer related to donor dependence, and lack of skills and research capacity for industrial implementation. In conclusion, a few strategies are offered for consideration on FOCAC utilising African and Chinese think tanks for sustainable development.

Background

The 21st century has been characterised by advanced medical research, digital convergence, development of nano-technology, the use of space for commerce and an increased spending on R&D by most developed countries. Africa however, is losing its scientists and researchers at an alarming rate, minimally budgeting for R&D and, it would seem, not shopping around for intellectual capital to innovate and produce new technologies. Currently, no country on the African continent is listed among the world's rising innovation hot spots – these countries include Russia, India, Taiwan, China, Singapore and South Korea – and Africa's inventors have secured very few patents.¹⁰

Unlike in previous centuries, modern knowledge production is shared in real time, without time and space barriers. What has changed, is not so much the fact that people suddenly discover and start using knowledge in economic activities, but that it is more about an economy – driven by modern information and communication technologies (ICTs) – that has profoundly changed the way in which information and knowledge are

produced, reproduced, reconfigured and disseminated. Open markets and competitiveness make it an imperative to invest in innovation and knowledge production. R&D and higher education increasingly play a crucial role in knowledge production and innovation to meet these new demands. This has led to greater investment in knowledge production and knowledge societies internationally.

A knowledge society typically operates within the paradigm of the economics of information. It values human capital as the prime input to production and innovation. A knowledge society is well connected via modern ICTs to the dematerialised economy, and has access to relevant and usable information. A highly sophisticated physical infrastructure underpins this economic model and allows the delivery of the material objects that are accessed and manipulated in the dematerialised world of modern ICTs.

The capacity of the African continent to produce knowledge societies has been hampered by many factors, including the digital divide, and low levels of skills and competency among governmental organisations. Policy transfer has been one of the key culprits of minimal knowledge production which has led to African countries' continued strategy of executing policies that are increasingly developed without their input. Policy transfer for the purpose of this chapter is defined as the application of state decision-making through external parties, be it donors, governments, or others. Dominique Darbon argues that Africa-related research has tended to focus 'on domination phenomena and the political and social consequences of the disconnections that came from the implementation of external models'.¹¹

Structural adjustment policies serve as a good example of policy transfer that had an impact on the level of knowledge output on the continent. Initially, after most African countries achieved their independence in the 1960s, the number of tertiary institutions and students in Africa surged in response to the demand for skilled personnel to run the new states. However, by the early 1980s, the Western world was convinced that structural adjustment programmes were the solution to the manifold economic crises of African states. Many governments eagerly pursued the programmes, seeing in them a kind of miraculous cure. Consequently, under the programmes, several African governments reduced education budgets, eliminated subsidies for students and devalued currencies, which raised the cost of imported educational materials. Today, many of Africa's universities and colleges are inadequately staffed and ill-equipped and their quality of education has declined. Many countries struggle to maintain even low

enrolment levels, and the academic research output in the region is among the lowest in the world.¹²

African governments were expected to adjust their maintenance expenditures to the resources that they were able to secure. The World Bank and other donors argued that investment in primary education yielded higher returns to society as a whole, while tertiary education produced returns only for their individual graduates. 'Because of a belief that primary and secondary schooling are more important than tertiary education for poverty reduction, the international development community encouraged African governments' relative neglect of higher education,' the World Bank later acknowledged in a 2006 study.¹³ The current poverty reduction strategies hold on to the fundamentals of the structural adjustment programmes. Often presented as national policy freely agreed upon by local governments, structural adjustment programmes can be best analysed as policies transferred from the World Bank after rounds of negotiation, and then set up as the desired solution for tattered African economies.¹⁴

Given the lack of funding for institutions of higher learning, research became an insignificant aspect of developmental growth on the continent. Furthermore, the production of research programmes attuned to the desires and the strategic options of the countries of the North, rather than to the specific needs of African countries. Consequently, most African countries began to appear as extensions of the scientific fields of the countries of the North, rather than as autonomous fields endowed with their own specific logic.¹⁵

Only recently have African countries and their donor partners begun to reconsider the role of tertiary education and higher education in promoting industrial development. Many efforts are being made at a regional and national level to promote knowledge production as a developmental strategy. In March 2011, African science ministers resolved that 2011 would be the start of an African decade for science, promising increased research budgets and attempts to use science and technology to drive development. A small, continent-wide research-grant programme, modeled on the European Union's framework programmes, is supposedly being planned, as is a Pan-African training network for researchers undertaking PhDs. Donors and governments alike are discussing the need for more home-grown funding for research.¹⁶ Furthermore, the African Science, Technology and Innovation Endowment Fund was established at a Science conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Businesses – a rare source of investment in academic research and development in Africa – are supposed to be encouraged to add to the

fund, which would provide innovation guidance and financial support for researchers and entrepreneurs. What is interesting about this fund is the focus on local donors such as Nigeria's Zenith Bank and Bank of Industry, Zemen Bank in Ethiopia, and Ethiopian Airlines.¹⁷

However, despite these developments, the continent still needs to do a major overhaul of its research development strategies. The first matter that needs to be addressed is the sometimes negative perception of knowledge production on the continent. South Africa provides a good case study as it actually funds a lot of its institutions. However, despite all the resource allocation and volumes of analysis provided by think tanks in an attempt to address many of the government's developmental challenges, there seems to be minimal application of the output produced. Secondly, skills transfer is another challenge as the brain drain is a threat to the quality of sustainable development and drains the capacity for education and research. What is more, the adverse impact of the brain drain is not only limited to a shortage of highly skilled professionals in sectors essential for the attainment of MDGs, but it also constrains developing countries financially.

Thirdly, despite severe budget spending shortfalls by many African governments, there is still a lack of political will by African governments to invest in research at the same level that developing countries such as China do. According to Thomas Reuters, the continent's wealthy nations – including oil producers such as Nigeria and Angola – generate fewer internationally recognised papers than many of their poorer neighbors when the sizes of their economies are taken into account. Although these countries could afford to put more funding into their universities, the money often goes into overseas accounts or is spent on imported goods rather than being invested domestically which directly promotes de-industrialisation.¹⁸

Along with the aforementioned donor challenge – which has produced policy transfer that has influenced African governance and decision-making – there is also the issue of the African think tank competition which is influencing what topics research institutes engage in, and how they sometimes engage with each other on a local, national and regional platform. Mutume Gumisai argues that the relationship of universities and think tanks remains ad hoc and disconnected.¹⁹ Moreover, as for example in China-Africa research, there is little coordination or cooperation among individual researchers and research institutes. Consequently, a lot of research overlaps while there are a lot of research areas that could be examined by various Africa scholars which would be more productive for the continent.

The influence of the brain drain on knowledge production

Human capital flight, more commonly referred to as the 'brain drain', is the large-scale emigration of a large group of individuals with technical skills or knowledge. The brain drain is usually regarded as an economic cost, since emigrants usually take with them the value of their training sponsored by the government or other organisations.²⁰ It is a parallel of capital flight, which refers to the same movement of financial capital. The term was coined by the British Royal Society to refer to the exodus of scientists and technologists from the UK to the US and Canada in the 1950s and 1960s.²¹ Now it is more typically used to refer to the emigration of a nation's most highly skilled individuals. Rapoport and Docquier note in their entry in the New Palgrave Dictionary that it is most commonly used to denote the migration of engineers, physicians, scientists, and other very highly skilled professionals with university training. Typically these movements are from developing to developed countries.²²

The World Bank estimates that on average 70 000 skilled Africans migrate to the EU and the US every year.²³ 'The brain drain has cost the African continent over US\$4 billion in the employment of 150 000 expatriate professionals annually.'²⁴ According to UNDP, Ethiopia lost 75% of its skilled workforce between 1980 and 1991, which harms the ability of such nations to get out of poverty. Nigeria, Kenya and Ethiopia are believed to be the most affected. In the case of Ethiopia, the country produces many excellent doctors, but there are more Ethiopian doctors in Chicago than there are in the whole of Ethiopia.²⁵ Ten years ago there were 1 600 medical doctors in Zambia, now only 400 are left – including newly trained doctors – as an average 160 of them leave the country every year. In Kenya, 90% of the nurses and doctors migrate to the EU and the US per year.²⁶ This exodus of medical and health service professionals has increased at an alarming rate, denying governments the possibility of maintaining their efforts to meet the MDGs in terms of their health programmes.

In a way, Western countries have contributed to the African brain drain by making it easy for skilled labour to migrate. For example, the EU Blue Card is a mechanism to meet their growing need for skilled labour. It provides fast processing of migration by removing barriers in the visa process and offering freedom of mobility within the EU. Furthermore, the Blue Card provides attractive conditions for the admission and residence of highly qualified immigrants needed for the EU economy. The US H1-B visa

programme – which is another visa recruiting mechanism for skilled labour – issued visas to an average of 130 000 workers a year for the decade 2000–2010, reaching a peak in 2007 at 154 000. The 2008 Commission for Africa Report estimates that more African scientists and engineers are working in the US than in the whole of Africa. Moreover, the focus on skilled Africans can be demonstrated by the fact that only 0.71% of the total migrants to the US have a school education of lower than Grade 12. Of the total African migrants to the US, 74% are highly educated professionals. Indeed this fact makes it abundantly clear that the number of uneducated Africans migrants to the US is insignificant.²⁷

To make matters worse, the brain drain is costing the continent \$4 billion dollars a year to replace them with expatriates from the West.²⁸ Huge consultancy fees for expatriates enhance the brain drain and migration of professionals by favouring and preferring returnees to locals, and international consultants to national experts. In Tanzania, an expatriate consultant would cost between US\$ 170 000–200 000 as this includes cost of living, hardship allowance, travel, child and school allowance.²⁹ However, the most expensive cost for a highly skilled local consultant would be less than half of the cost for an international consultant. In response to the high level challenges regarding the brain drain and research production, former South African President Thabo Mbeki stated in his 1998 African Renaissance speech:

In our world in which the generation of new knowledge and its application to change the human condition is the engine which moves human society further away from barbarism, do we not have need to recall Africa's hundreds of thousands of intellectuals back from their places of emigration in Western Europe and North America, to rejoin those who remain still within our shores? I dream of the day when these, the African mathematicians and computer specialists in Washington and New York, the African physicists, engineers, doctors, business managers and economists, will return from London and Manchester and Paris and Brussels to add to the African pool of brain power, to enquire into and find solutions to Africa's problems and challenges, to open the African door to the world of knowledge, to elevate Africa's place within the universe of research, the information of new knowledge, education and information.³⁰

A study entitled 'Rising Above the Gathering Storm', published by the US National Academies references an economic study in the mid-1950s, concludes that 85% of measured growth in income per capita in the US

during the period 1890–1950 were due to the effects of technological innovation.³¹ Further evidence for a tight relationship between technological innovation and education is provided by a study from the US Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in 1997. This study found that by 1997, MIT graduates and staff had founded 4 000 companies with aggregate revenues of US\$ 232 billion. The study also demonstrated how they encouraged industrial development.³²

Needless to say, a major link between higher education and economic development, is innovation. A recent paper entitled, 'Brain Drain or Brain Bank? The Impact of Skilled Emigration on Poor Country Innovation', analyses the impact of migration on innovation. The authors argue that development prospects depend in part on the capacity for innovation and that access to technological knowledge drives innovation. Innovators must have appropriate skills in order to use available knowledge. Without a critical mass of active local innovators, the benefits of knowledge can only be bought. The authors present a compelling case for the importance of local, domestic innovation, arguing that local knowledge accelerates the international diffusion of technologies.³³

This chapter advocates that the brain drain challenge could be addressed by promoting innovation technology between local African and Chinese researchers. The fact is that the majority of skilled human capital is not going to migrate back from the West. Information Communication Technology (ICT) is probably the key strategy that could be utilised in reversing the challenges brought about by the brain drain. This ICT process could be facilitated through the deployment of advanced information and distributed computing technologies. The distinguishing feature in the use of distributed computing technologies is to mitigate the impact of the circulation of highly skilled individuals on development and thus enabling students and researchers in Africa to run innovative technology-based projects in their home countries, aided by interaction with experts in China. Such digital connections to China can strengthen existing local skills and develop new ones, enabling more effective access to knowledge from abroad, and its application to the solution of local problems. Furthermore, distributing computing technologies will help bridge the divide in higher education between developing countries and developed ones through remote access to rare or expensive resources including data, computers, and scientific instruments.

No geographical region has a monopoly on intelligence or creativity. Virtual research can help remove the educational quality gap between developing and developed parts of the world. Virtual laboratories and remote

access to rare or expensive resources can help small, low-budget universities enjoy access to infrastructure of the same quality as large, well-endowed ones. This interaction can be used for innovative education development, for strengthening existing local skill and developing new skills, enabling more effective access to knowledge from abroad, and promoting local content and solutions to local problems without travel. More broadly, the implementation of an electronic infrastructure for education under FOCAC may significantly increase capacity-building for industrial development between both regions.

Finally, virtual research could ensure that African researchers utilise the collaboration to not leave the continent as the FOCAC cooperation provides many financial opportunities, including some leeway to engage in impact-based research. One of the major hurdles of engaging in research in most African countries, is the limited pool of funding that often drives research agendas. Sponsorship of at least 100 programmes by academic institutions and scholars from both sides covering topical research without the stringent conditions of the West, is a constructive solution for both the scholar and the continent. Indeed, the FOCAC think tank collaboration is a vehicle that could reduce the number of African scholars who only look to the West to pursue their academic careers.

Harnessing political will for increased knowledge production

The development of human capital represents one of the most important factors that facilitate development and industrial growth. As Norris puts it, ‘human capital represents that property that allows people to live and work productively.’³⁴ One can therefore state that the most valuable asset of a knowledge society is its intellectual capital, which presumes that a society must invest in its people. A glaring example of limited investment in continental intellectual capital is Africa’s contribution to world book output is in the region of 3% which, according to Ngoben, suggests that African publishing is not only in its infancy, it is also miniscule.³⁵ One of the key reasons for this low level of research output, Ngoben argues, is due to lack of government funding.

In 1980, the African leaders’ Lagos Plan of Action called for countries to allocate at least 1% of GDP to R&D, to help spur on the continent’s development. However, despite this well-articulated plan – according to Mr Abdoulaye Janneh, Executive Secretary of the Addis Ababa-based UN Economic Commission – most African countries devote considerably lower

funding to R&D. Furthermore, he argues, in many African countries, national policies to promote science and technology are outdated, and the quality of science and engineering education is also declining, in part owing to a lack of money and of infrastructure such as state-of-the-art labs and technology centres.³⁶ Limited political will regarding knowledge production on the continent is also illustrated by the AU acknowledgement that the research lag is not primarily the result of limited funding, but of a lack of appreciation for the value of such investments. The 'return on the investment in science and technology is not appreciated by policy makers and even African industry.'³⁷

Mozambican President Armando Guebuza noted in January 2011, when African leaders met in Addis Ababa, many still did not have a full grasp of issues related to knowledge production and industrial development. For further emphasis, he stated:

*Even during this summit, we had to call upon the experts to point out the importance of science and technology, so that even those among us who have not yet understood very well how imperative it is to develop science on our continent can now also accept this task. It must be made clear that without the commitment of the leadership, there can be no scientific and technological development on our continent.*³⁸

This is not to say that there is zero knowledge production on the continent. Nigeria is one of the leading countries of knowledge production in Africa. Since returning to civilian rule in 1999, the country has invested heavily in the R&D sector. In 2003 it launched a micro-satellite to monitor the environment and provide information for infrastructure development. The following year the government asked UNESCO to help it develop a national science and technology plan. The project involved analyses of government policies and spending in the sector and a review of the curricula content and capacity in the country's 75 research institutes, 55 universities and 44 polytechnics. In 2006 the country approved a US\$ 5 billion endowment fund for science and technology development, drawn from oil export revenues and supplemented by funds from donors and private companies.³⁹ Egypt and South Africa have also attained significant success, as noted by UNESCO's Science Report 2005. South Africa – which in 2002 spent US\$ 3.1 billion on research and development (equivalent to 0.7% of its GDP) – has advanced science research capabilities in aeronautics, nuclear engineering, chemistry, metallurgy, agriculture and medicine. Egypt leads North Africa

in chemistry and engineering. In 2000 it spent US\$ 400 million on research and development.⁴⁰

One of the top 10 priorities of the New Partnership for Development (NEPAD) is human development, with specific reference to education. As part of its Human Capacity Development strategy NEPAD has also launched an e-school initiative focusing on teaching school children as well as teachers ICT skills.⁴¹ Some countries in Africa have made remarkable progress in education. Mozambique for example doubled the number of children in school over the past five years and Kenya recently introduced free primary education. This has brought more than 1.2 million children back to school. In Tanzania, 1 000 new schools have been built and 18 000 new teachers were recruited.⁴²

However, despite these positive aspects of investment in knowledge production, if the continental leadership desires that Africa becomes an effective player in the global market, many more academic hurdles will have to be cleared to assist the continent attain industrial best practices. Making knowledge production available to the general public remains a challenge, as there are still serious infrastructural and logistical barriers that impede the printed as well as electronic availability of African content within and between African countries. African authors who wish to publish locally face the problem that there are not many African scholarly journals of good quality, and the number is declining. Most of these publications are also not available in electronic format. Many are poorly run and edited and appear irregularly, so that libraries in the North do not want to subscribe to them.⁴³ Omekwu states that journal publication in Africa is 'highly unsustainable' because these journals mostly survive on grants and few fortunate African universities rely again on grants to buy them. The journals also lack a steady subscriber base and are financially insecure. Moreover, marketing is minimal and distribution is poor.⁴⁴

The lack of a subscriber base raises the issues of research application by African governments. The state is a very important actor in the strategic harnessing of knowledge for development. It sets the policies, creates the incentives, establishes the regulatory framework and provides the funding. In order for policies such as mineral beneficiation in South Africa – as set out in the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 26 of 2002 – to be implemented, one of the requirements would be for the government to ensure that the policy is not just a political solution, but premised on knowledge production. The mineral beneficiation matter serves as a good example, as most African countries depend on resource extraction that does

not necessarily promote industrial growth.

From a perspective of subscriber bases and research application, the mineral beneficiation matter actually raises critical questions as to the level of research consumption when it is the government that has actually requested the particular information. In a nutshell, the extent to which knowledge is strategically harnessed to achieve industrial growth in any country, depends on its application and political will to craft and implement necessary state policy. However, as the Mozambican president indicated, there is some ignorance regarding the impact of knowledge production in decision-making.

The mineral beneficiation issue also presents South Africa as a good case study as in 2011 many scholars and practitioners were recruited by the African National Congress (ANC) and the private sector to assess and produce research analysis on whether or not nationalisation could address the economic disparities in the country. Though a decision was made by the ANC not to nationalise, it remains to be seen if all the knowledge produced was put to good use. In general, South Africa has the highest level of knowledge production on the continent, consisting of a high number of books, journals, policy briefs and so forth. Unfortunately, a number of these publications are collecting dust irrespective of the investment the government allocates to their output. For example, South Africa currently rates highest in the number of service delivery protests in the world. Yet, despite the wealth of information produced by its academia in various Public Administration journals and papers on how service delivery could be improved, the government is still seeking for a cure internally and externally to address its industrial woes.

South Africa has become no different from other African countries in also promoting policy transfer in its country. This policy transfer practice makes it difficult for local institutions which are then required to compete with international or donor funded institutions in order to feed information to their main stakeholder, the government. This practice is very alien in the West or other emerging markets, which tend to utilise their own research bodies. While it should be acknowledged that at times the local research institutes – particularly government funded ones – may not necessarily be marketing themselves well, or not producing impact-based knowledge production, it is essential that African governments work more closely with their local and government funded institutions.

African governments also need to work more closely with their research institutions to develop a scientific plan that could be built into their AU

industrial framework. Currently, there is no knowledge production aligned into the AU industrial plan. Most policies do not recognise knowledge production as part of their developmental plan which is key for rapid growth as established in the China case. Unless academics fit into the national and regional frameworks for economic growth and industrial development, then the idea of working with Chinese researchers to influence decision-making at the FOCAC level remains out of reach.

Finally, the process of recruiting research institutes to work with the continental body in promoting industrial growth, remains a challenge. Consulting the AU in its policy decision-making is also a very competitive field; many research institutes do not want to work on one platform with the AU, but tend to favour a fragmented approach in order to be viewed as the most influential research institute. This fragmented approach among African think tanks is problematic and raises questions as to whether or not they can form an effective block under FOCAC.

Case in point, Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) universities tend to work in isolation from their counterparts in the region and collaboration tends to be biased in favour of universities from the developed world. In Lesotho and Swaziland, for example, foreign researchers – outside Africa – shared authorship on every science and engineering article produced. In South Africa, 50% of all science and engineering papers are co-authored by foreign academics, compared with 30% in the US. Intra-regional collaboration would optimise local expertise and knowledge-sharing, and decrease dependency on foreign support.⁴⁵

It is also important to note that the current academic platform being created under the FOCAC umbrella came about owing to the Chinese think tanks. While the African think tanks that focus on China affairs have met quite often over the past few years, there is an unhealthy competition that lingers where some think tanks of Africa-China experts still tend to be marginalised. The fact is, the FOCAC research umbrella over the years has become so extensive, given the various measures that have been presented, that the only way for African scholars to make an impact, is to reach out to more scholars and collaborate more strategically. Before African think tanks can work on any international platform as a regional group designed to influence policy-making critical for industrial development, these institutes along with the AU and its member states need to establish an effective academic platform that is inclusive of all researchers engaged in impact-based knowledge production.

Donor dependence and policy transfer

Historically African states have had limited flexibility in matters of policy conception and internal state development, owing to their dependence on development aid. Policy transfer issues are unquestionably a topic of the highest interest for administrative and political sciences. In various African countries research tends to be motivated in ad hoc ways. Research is mainly externally initiated and, for that reason, donor-driven or driven by interests of academic institutions of donor countries. Tom Ewang maintains that at least 99.9% of research funding for most institutes on the continent comes from outside.⁴⁶ The reliance on development aid from foreign donors has made it difficult to coordinate research activities within a country and to ensure that research priorities match industrial development priorities. Undoing this dependency that has become ingrained in many of the continent's research institutions over decades, will not be easy.

Yet Malcolm Molyneux, a professor of tropical medicine at the University of Liverpool in the UK maintains that donor aid will thrive as most African governments have more pressing priorities than funding science. He states:

When a country is manifestly inadequate in every compartment of its responsibilities in education, health and agriculture, it's difficult to pontificate that more should be spent on research when there is a possibility of this being acquired from outside.⁴⁷

Some scholars maintain that the millions flowing from philanthropists, NGOs, aid agencies and traditional research funders into African science are undermining efforts to convince African governments to spend more money on research. Others argue that aid dependence on international aid causes big problems for African scientists particularly since projects can be interrupted when grants run out. Furthermore, the research agendas are set by donors who have their own priorities, rather than by African researchers and policy-makers.

On the one hand, Boone emphasises that there has never been a significant correlation between aid and development, that aid perpetuates a culture of dependence, breeds corruption and kleptocracy, and stunts local development initiatives. Furthermore, donor development for the most part has led to a situation where Africa has failed to set its own pace and direction of development free of external interference.⁴⁸ On the other hand, empirical evidence shows that former less developed countries, such as

Chile, South Korea, Japan and Nicaragua, that have received very little aid compared to Africa, have produced superior results in terms of development and economic growth. In Nicaragua, which had virtually all of its aid cut off since the collapse of the Somoza regime in 1979, the situation improved noticeably during the 1980s in terms of reducing illiteracy, infant mortality rates and general improvement in the social welfare.⁴⁹

While this chapter advocates the need for collaboration under the FOCAC umbrella to promote knowledge production and possibly increase research output that would in turn facilitate industrial growth, it does not advocate that the African continent should continue this dependency by looking East. The issue of knowledge production is a continental matter that requires internal political will by African governments. There is plenty of evidence regarding the capacity for Africa to become a global academic force. According to Global Research Report Africa between 2004 and 2008, Nigerian scientists were co-authors on nearly 1% of agricultural science papers published in international journals, and Kenyans co-authored nearly 0.5% of the world's immunology papers and more than 0.3% of environment and/or ecology papers.⁵⁰ The number of publications – regardless of how high or how low – demonstrates the capacity to produce.

The continent needs to wean itself from its donor dependence on research production by reforming its institutional processes in higher learning and educational institutions. Unless Africa reforms its knowledge production methods, the continent will continue practising policy transfer measures that have a potential of maintaining the current industrial status quo. Reform should include the capacity to assess and reward measurable progress in innovation and the execution of research projects. Reform should also include more state interest and capacity building of its local knowledge production. Capacity building should enable institutions to retain professionals and researchers by paying better salaries and assigning professionals to teach and conduct research. Moreover, improving capacity for disseminating information on research projects and findings to the wider society, is necessary as it will promote ways and means of capacitating various industry initiatives.

Conclusion

Emerging markets such as China and Brazil have demonstrated how knowledge-based competition within a global economy is essential for any level of industrial development to materialise. The rapid growth rate

by China demonstrates the importance of a well-developed and maintained infrastructure; industrial development including roads, railways, and airports cannot be over-emphasised. It is an input to all other economic activities and allows consumption as well as economic participation. The World Bank, in one of its official documents, *Ten Things You Never Knew About the World Bank In Africa*, specifically points out that adequate industrial growth in Africa is a prerequisite to increased trade that will consequently spur on economic growth. According to this report, an improved infrastructure across the region will not only lower transportation and energy costs, but will also make African products and services more competitive in the global economy.⁵¹

This chapter has illustrated how R&D is crucial to any economic development. In the introduction the priorities of the AU demonstrates that R&D is valued in Africa. The challenge lies in ensuring that AU member states develop a stronger scientific plan in the industrial growth structures, and show the necessary political will to implement them. In order to catch up with developing countries, the continent needs to exert extra political commitment necessary to secure an effective scientific infrastructure. Although new ICTs certainly will not solve all Africa's problems, they offer a new and challenging opportunity for Africa to become a knowledge society and to participate as an equal partner in the competitive information-based economy. The brain drain which is currently haemorrhaging the continent's growth can be addressed through a knowledge-based society that links with countries like China to bridge the developmental gap and curb migration to the West.

As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, over the years South-South think tanks – which include Chinese and African think tanks – have had much more cooperation with their Western counterparts than between themselves. There is no reason why Chinese and African think tanks should not help each other, cooperate for greater strength, conduct more academic exchanges, and carry out joint conferences and research projects to promote their developmental strategies. The onus is on the academic elites of both sides to take upon themselves the historical responsibilities and missions necessary to continuously improve their theoretical and practical experiences. Furthermore, in order for the China-Africa think tank cooperation to effectively provide joint solutions to common problems, the African think tanks will need to consolidate into an effective block with the Chinese under one FOCAC umbrella.

In conclusion, education and investment in human capital through knowledge production are fundamental to the creation of a knowledge

society and knowledge economy. A knowledge economy is also fundamental in ensuring that Africa starts benefiting its own minerals and improves its agricultural growth for sustainable industrial growth. Without a strong, sustainable knowledge production sector, Africa will always remain in a dangerously dependent industrial position, and will never succeed in developing 'African solutions to African problems.'

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CHAPTER FIVE

Chinese medical cooperation in Africa from the pre-FOCAC era to the present

Li Anshan

Introduction

More than 12 years have passed since the set-up of FOCAC, an event that marked an important milestone in China-Africa history. Since then, China's policy towards Africa became the focus of the international community, while for China, South-South cooperation became more significant. Typical of South-South cooperation is the medical cooperation, which is an important part of China's ODA. There is a general view in the West regarding the purpose of China to promote China-African cooperation, to seek raw materials to 'feed its massive industrial surge' and to gain 'sovereign control over stable supplies of primary goods'.¹ Some even accused China of practising 'new colonialism' or 'economic imperialism'.²

Using China's medical cooperation with Africa as an example, this chapter argues that China-Africa cooperation in medical fields has a long history, which started from as early as 1963. The cooperation includes Chinese medical teams (hereafter CMT),³ the anti-malaria campaign, training African medical personnel, China-supported medications, facilities and hospitals in Africa, and Chinese medical cooperation with WHO and other international institutions in Africa. Thus China contributed a great deal to the nurture of China-Africa relations. With the establishment of FOCAC in 2000, the medical cooperation has spread to various fields, including the set-up of the anti-malaria centre, the dispatch of medical staff for the UN Peace-keeping Force and humanitarian assistance. What is the status of these initiatives? What has been done in the past years? What form has China-Africa medical cooperation taken in past years? There has been little mentioned in the international community. This chapter deals with China-Africa medical cooperation, with an emphasis on CMT and the anti-malaria campaign.

The Chinese medical team at work

While medical cooperation in general is one of the most active forms of assistance, the dispatch of CMTs by the government to undertake voluntary work in the countries concerned, is the oldest and most effective form of Chinese medical cooperation in Africa⁴ In July 1962, after the victory of the liberation movement and the withdrawal of French medical staff, the Algerian government called on the international community for medical assistance. The Chinese government received the message through two channels, the Red Cross and the Algerian Minister of Health. In January 1963, China was the first country to express its willingness to provide medical assistance to Algeria, thereby marking the beginning of China's provision of medical aid to other countries.⁵

In general, CMTs are dispatched on the basis of one province per one or more African country. During the 1960s, seven medical teams were sent to six African countries (Somalia, Congo Brazzaville, Mali, Mauritania, Guinea and Algeria) and two each to Zanzibar and Tanganyika. This assistance was rewarded with great support from African countries, especially in the UN General Assembly in 1972, when 26 African countries voted in favour of recognition of the legitimate status of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the UN.

In the 1970s, the number of CMTs in Africa greatly increased. The decade witnessed the advent of CMTs in 22 countries. There were several reasons for this boom. First, the reputation of these CMTs had gradually spread across the continent and more African governments sought medical assistance. Secondly, China had diplomatic relations with 44 African countries at the time and many asked for assistance. Thirdly, China resumed its seat in the UN with the help of developing countries. To show its gratitude, China increased its financial assistance to developing countries. The period 1971–1978 was a time of rapid increase in China's foreign aid.⁶ Unfortunately, from 1979 to 1982, there was a slowdown in China-African relations, characterised by decreased financial aid, declining bilateral trade and a reduction in the number of CMTs.⁷

In the 1980s, China continued to dispatch CMTs to African countries, including Botswana, Djibouti, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Libya, Cape Verde, Liberia, Burundi and the Seychelles. From 1988 to 1995, while CMTs remained in African countries, there was no increase in their number. However, in 1996, CMTs from Zhejiang province arrived in Namibia. China also sent CMTs to the Comoros and Lesotho in 1996 and 1997 respectively.

During the 1990s, some changes regarding CMTs in Africa occurred: some teams withdrew, others resumed their work and some of the dispatching provinces changed. China started providing CMT services to Angola and Ghana in 2009.

For the past 46 years, China has cooperated with Africa by dispatching CMTs to provide free medical services. In addition, China has offered free facilities and medication, trained African medical personnel and built hospitals in various African countries. Unique in international relations, the CMTs have aroused interest abroad.⁸

The establishment of FOCAC started a new phase of Chinese medical cooperation with Africa. During the first FOCAC period, medical aid agreements with 40 African countries were signed, and cooperation in preventing and treating AIDS, malaria and pulmonary tuberculosis was continued. From 2003 onwards, China began to dispatch Chinese medical soldiers with the UN Peace-keeping Force (hereafter UNPKF) in the Democratic Republic of Congo. For example, the second group sent to the Democratic Republic of Congo treated more than 1 000 patients and provided medical services to more than 2 000 UNPKF soldiers in the country. Their excellent service was greatly praised by both the UNPKF commander and the local people.⁹

FOCAC III held in 2006 greatly promoted the bilateral cooperation between China and Africa in the medical field. According to the plan, 28 hospitals and 30 anti-malaria centres would be built in African countries. The Chinese government also promised to send 1 200 medical workers to 42 African countries and regions. All these promises were fulfilled in three years.¹⁰ Up to the beginning of 2009, 45 CMTs had worked in 44 African countries, and 900 members were working in 100 hospitals or health centres. Besides CMTs, China-Africa cooperation is expressed in other fields, such as the provision of medication and medical facilities, running training courses, as well as training African medical specialists in China.¹¹ Most importantly, China started to set up anti-malaria centres in African countries, as promised by President Hu in 2006.

China's anti-malaria campaign in Africa

Tropical diseases and epidemics are the major threats to the good health of African people. A recent UNICEF report disclosed that five million children under the age of five died in Africa in 2006. Malaria is the number one killer, with about one million children dying of it every year.¹² To fight malaria in

Africa, the Chinese government adopted several measures simultaneously, namely CMTs, training programmes, the anti-malaria project, free facilities and drugs and the anti-malaria centre.

Combating malaria has been one of the major tasks of the CMTs and CMT members have had to contend with malaria themselves. They usually distribute free medication to patients. Cotecxin, the most effective anti-malaria drug produced in China, has earned a great reputation in Africa. In certain areas, life habits and the abuse of medication can result in very serious diseases. In Mali, for example, malaria is very common and people should treat it with quinine. Yet many people suffer hemiplegia in the limbs as a result of the overuse of quinine. Chinese acupuncture expert Cai Weigeng has cured many hemiplegia patients. CMTs from Ninxia provide services in Benin. Besides their daily work, they also run various medical training courses. To help local medical workers, they compiled a book entitled *One Hundred Cases of Prevention and Treatment of African Children's Brain Malaria* as a reference work for Benin medical doctors. In the 1990s, the Zanzibar Minister of Culture once suffered from the sequelae of malaria, and was treated by CMT member Dr Zhang Zidian.

China holds uninterrupted training programmes either in Africa or China to provide knowledge concerning anti-malaria measures to African medical specialists and government officials. In 2002, the Jiangsu Centre for Verminosis Control and Prevention in eastern China was designated by the Ministry of Commerce as the base for international human resource development assistance. Since then, the centre has run six programmes for medical staff and officials from Africa, as a result of which 169 officials and special technicians from 43 countries have undergone training.¹³ In July–August 2003, two anti-malaria training programmes ran in Madagascar, Kenya and Cameroon. In Nairobi, six Chinese experts and 28 African participants from 14 countries attended the one-week training course, which was highly praised by African participants as well as the Kenyan Minister of Health and the Chinese ambassador. In the same year, distinguished malaria expert Gao Qi travelled to Madagascar, Kenya and Cameroon to present training courses on the control and prevention of malaria, to medical personnel from 35 African countries.

In Uganda, malaria kills over 80 000 people per year, mostly pregnant women and children. China has fulfilled its pledge to donate anti-malaria medication and carry out anti-malaria training programmes in Uganda. In November 2006, soon after the China-Africa Summit, a three-day anti-malaria programme was held in Kampala as part of China's efforts to

join forces with Uganda to fight the disease. Stephen Malinga, Uganda's Minister of Health, hailed the Chinese government for financing the course, saying this gesture was an indication of the increasingly cordial relations between the two countries.¹⁴ The Jiangsu Centre also sent experts to Senegal to provide anti-malaria training to more than 180 local health officials and medical specialists.

Carrying out the project of control and prevention effectively, is the third element in anti-malaria cooperation. For example, on Moheli island in the Comoros, villages are greatly affected by malaria. The highest incidence is 94.4% and malaria is the most common cause of death in children under the age of five. In 2007, a joint project between Moheli and the Tropical Medicine Institute at Guangzhou University of Traditional Chinese Medicine (GUTCM) in southern China, was started with the purpose of eradicating the parasite from the human body. According to Li Guoqiao (misspelt Li Guoqiang), the project leader and a professor at the institute at GUTCM, the real source of malaria is the human body. 'When it is driven out of humans, mosquitoes will not carry it, since mosquitoes get it from humans. And once the parasite is not around, malaria will be exterminated'. Under the plan, the islanders would be prescribed a single dose of artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACTs) and primaquine, which they would all consume at the same time to clear the parasite from their bodies (Tan).¹⁵

As part of growing Chinese aid and investment in Africa, Beijing would pay the estimated US\$ 320 000 for the drugs used in the Moheli treatments and would also meet the cost of additional drugs used to clear up remaining infections over a five-year period.¹⁶ On 22 December 2008 a meeting of the China Aid Project for the Eradication of Malaria by GUTCM was held on Moheli. President Ahmed Abdalla Mohamed Sambi and the UN representative attended, along with the Chinese ambassador and experts from GUTCM. According to a survey in September 2007, 23% of residents are affected, with some villages, as noted, having a 94.4% infection rate. With the implementation of the measures developed by Prof. Li, the rate of infection decreased by 98.7%, to as low as below 1%, and the number of infected people decreased by 89.9%. What is more, there were no more deaths from malaria. The President of the Comoros concluded the meeting by saying the Moheli case indicates that the eradication measures employed are the most effective in the world and should be introduced not only to the other islands of the Comoros, but to all affected areas.¹⁷

In combating malaria, drugs are vital. When a delegation of 13 senior African government officials visited a Shanghai-based pharmaceutical

company in 2005, they called for further cooperation with China on anti-malaria drugs. Among the delegation were the Comoros' Vice President Caabi El-Yachroutu Mohamed and the AU's commissioner for social affairs, Bience Gawanas. They also called on Chinese pharmaceutical companies to set up manufacturing plants on the African continent.¹⁸ The facilities and anti-malaria drugs have been provided to African countries free of charge.

As mentioned earlier, one of the most important drugs is Cotecxin. As early as 1993, Beijing Holley-Cotec developed a new medicine called DihydroArtemisinin or 'Cotecxin', and it was approved by the WHO as an effective anti-malaria drug. In 1996, the Chinese Ministry of Health designated Cotecxin as a required medicine for CMTs, so that it began to spread throughout all the countries in which CMTs served. It is also often chosen as part of ODA. What is more, the pharmaceutical companies also donate Artemisinin to African countries. For example, in 2007 Yunnan Kunming Pharmaceutical Company offered anti-malaria drugs worth CFA 42 million to Côte d'Ivoire to control and prevent the disease, and President Gbagbo expressed sincere thanks to the company.¹⁹

Cotecxin has often been given as a state gift when Chinese leaders visit Africa. When President Jiang Zemin visited Africa in 2002, he sent Nigeria Cotecxin as a gift for the children's malaria project. In 2004, Chinese National Congress Chair Wu Bangguo went to Africa with a donation of Cotecxin for the countries he visited. In April 2006, President Hu Jintao donated the anti-malaria drug when he visited Africa. In 2006, the artesunate injection developed by Guilin Pharmaceutical Company was tested as most effective and was listed by the WHO as the first choice in the emergency treatment of malaria. The company has met the Good Manufacturing Practices requirements of the WHO, and has developed holograms as a device to fight counterfeiting. Artemisinin-based combination therapies (ACTs) are recognised by the WHO as the safest and best existing treatments for malaria. The WHO has moved to step up cultivation of *Artemisia annua* in east Africa in a bid to ensure a reliable supply and to reduce costs.

The last and most important measure is the establishment of anti-malaria centres in Africa, a direct result of the 2006 FOCAC meeting. Preparations began right after the meeting, with several teams travelling to Africa to set up the centres. One delegation went to Liberia to set up that country's first anti-malaria centre, while the other visited Tanzania, Zambia, South Africa, Kenya and Madagascar for the same purpose. In addition, the first group of 60 medical experts destined to work in the anti-

malaria centres in Africa, attended a 10-day professional training course at the Jiangsu Center of Verminosis Control and Prevention in October 2007. The trainees were selected from hospitals, medical labs and academies across the country, and went to Africa to treat malaria-affected patients and pass on their knowledge to African colleagues. Vice-minister Wei Jianguo was in charge of medical cooperation with Africa. At a meeting on anti-malaria centres held on 16 January 2008, he called for the sustainable development of the centres and discussed the issue with various department heads in the ministry, as well as CEOs from the companies producing anti-malaria drugs.²⁰

After the establishment of the anti-malaria centres, Chinese experts could set up and test the facilities, exchange ideas with local specialists and give technological training to medical staff. For the following three years, the Chinese government provided the centres' facilities and drugs free of charge. It is important that the centres should serve as national bases; not only for laboratory and clinical departments, but also, and more importantly, for research into anti-malaria strategies (including malaria prevention), for exchanges of advanced technology and for training medical staff.

Serving Africans the Chinese way

China-Africa cooperation has contributed a great deal to the treatment of African patients, improvement of the public health systems and raising the standard of local medical services. Africans comprise 60% of the world's population living with HIV/Aids, and account for about 90% of the cases of and 99% of deaths from cholera. The situation concerning the public health systems is equally dismal. Many African countries face a critical shortage of medical personnel at nearly all levels.

Serving the people is the fundamental aim of public health systems, and Chinese doctors have tried their best to promote this objective. In Algeria, for example, for 45 years the CMT programme has expanded its 16 treatment units to 21 provinces and cities, covering more than 10 medical specialities. Thus, this CMT programme has become the biggest and most influential in Africa.²¹ The great advantage of the CMT programme is the provision of Chinese traditional medical treatment, especially acupuncture. For example, the Algerian Defence Minister broke his leg which failed to heal, until Chinese doctors treated the wound using acupuncture.

The reputation of CMTs has spread to neighbouring countries, with

the Algerian Minister of Health commenting: 'The influence of CMTs has passed through Algeria, and spread to the whole world'.²² Dr Wen Hong was highly praised by patients, and was finally invited by Paul Biya, the President of Cameroon, to provide medical services to him personally.²³ Wen realised the advantage of Chinese traditional medical treatments, for which Western medical treatments were no substitute. He once said, 'The spread of acupuncture in Africa is really closely related to the CMTs. Wherever there is a CMT, even if one medical point is only manned by two persons, one of them should be a doctor of acupuncture'.²⁴ In Mali, the climate and living conditions have led to many cases of rheumatism, arthritis and psoriatic strain, for which acupuncture is the most effective treatment. CMTs in Niger treated 57 330 patients, of whom 5 120 were treated with acupuncture. Indeed, several ministers showed great interest in Chinese medicine and acupuncture.²⁵

One of the characteristics of the CMT programme is serving the common people. The president of Maskara Hospital in Algeria once said: 'Frankly speaking, Maskara Hospital's reputation came with the arrival of Chinese doctors'.²⁶ Chinese doctors have carried out a number of remarkable operations. Dai Zhiben successfully performed the reattachment of an Algerian youth's severed limb, while Li Shiqi reattached a severed limb following the removal of a tumour. Chen Yijun, for his part, performed the first successful operation to lengthen a thighbone and Jiang Xiugao removed a large tumour from a patient's neck.²⁷ Doctors from Ninxia CMT removed a growth of 23 kilograms from a woman's ovary in Benin and Dr Shang opened a patient's head in order to save his life.²⁸ Jiangshu CMT saved a girl's life after her heart stopped for 30 minutes.²⁹ Hunan CMT launched a vision project, and successfully removed the cataracts from 248 patients in Sierra Leone, free of charge. Sichuan doctor Jiang Yongshen cured 22 patients and became the personal physician of the President of Mozambique.³⁰

Improving the local medical system

In order to improve local public health systems, China has cooperated with African countries in various ways, such as building hospital and medical facilities, providing free medication and transferring Chinese medical techniques. In Congo-Brazzaville, the hospital for gynaecology and obstetrics was a small one in the 1960s. With the help of China in the 1970s, it is now the third biggest comprehensive hospital in Brazzaville. It has 23

Chinese doctors on its staff, who play a significant role in the hospital.

Gradually, CMT doctors become important actors in some of the big hospitals in African cities. Chinese doctors also help to establish medical specialities and technical facilities (such as plastics). The speciality of acupuncture has become evident in Tunisia, Cameroon, Lesotho, Namibia and Madagascar. The acupuncture department in the Hospital for Women and Children in Cameroon has a very good reputation, and there is always a long queue of patients awaiting treatment each morning. CMTs in Lesotho set up a department of acupuncture to serve both the king and his subjects, who for the first time have the opportunity to experience the magical effects of the small silver needle. In Namibia, after establishing the department of acupuncture, CMTs very quickly changed the people's view of this treatment, and the first lady specifically invited Chinese doctors to practise in the president's house.³¹

China-Africa cooperation has also promoted institutional innovation in African medical systems. The establishment of the centre of acupuncture in Tunisia is one example. China set up the Marsa Centre of Acupuncture in the capital in 1994, the first in Africa, at the behest of the Tunisian government. The staff comprises four or five Chinese doctors and several Tunisian assistants. Besides medical treatment, the centre is also responsible for teaching and for providing training materials to students, who are working doctors from other medical institutions and hospitals. After theoretical studies, operating studies, examinations and the defence of their theses, students can obtain a special diploma in acupuncture. The centre treated 20 530 patients between 1996 and 1998 and the Tunisian Minister of Health has proudly pointed to the centre of acupuncture as the symbol of friendship between the two countries.

In order to meet the needs of the people, the state health insurance company in Tunisia decided to set up a department of acupuncture at Bizerta hospital. Since the graduates of the Marsa centre had already taken charge of important work in the hospital, it was not difficult to establish the first department of acupuncture in Tunisia.³² The Tunisian and Chinese doctors jointly ran a Chinese Medicine and Acupuncture Day in 2007 and demonstrated various procedures and techniques, as well as answered questions. The day elicited a great amount of excitement and local interest, along with reports by TV stations.³³

Courses on acupuncture have started at universities in various African countries. A Guinean student named Segu Kamala began to study medical science and Chinese medicine as early as 1973 and spent eight years in

China. After his return to Guinea, he insisted on performing an acupuncture operation. His efforts finally brought acupuncture to public attention. Conakry University has listed acupuncture as a required course since 2000, the first such instance in Africa.³⁴ Chinese doctor Jiang Yongshen has treated 140 000 patients in Mozambique, trained a group of local medical specialists in acupuncture, and initiated a course in traditional Chinese medical techniques at the Universidade Eduardo Mondlane medical school.³⁵ Under the auspices of CMTs, Madagascar's state public health school has set up a special class in acupuncture.³⁶

Raising local medical standards

Chinese doctors have also tried to transfer knowledge of medical techniques to local doctors. When Premier Zhou Enlai visited Zanzibar in 1965, he told the CMT members there that CMTs would sooner or later return home. It was therefore necessary that Zanzibar's doctors should be trained and helped to work independently. In this way, China would 'leave a medical team which would never go away' and 'thus support the liberation cause of African people'.³⁷

When Mao Zedong met President Nyerere, he pointed out that the work of the CMT in Tanzania should be 'helping' and 'teaching'. Premier Zhou Enlai added:

*Now we have several dozens of CMTs abroad, yet it is not enough. CMTs should not only cure the disease, but also help training work. They should bring ... medicine and facilities, train African doctors, who can be ... self reliant, and would work even if the CMT went away. We would provide sincere help to any independent country. Our assistance is to make the country able to stand up. Just like ... building a bridge, so you can cross the river without a staff. That would be good.*³⁸

CMTs usually help local doctors by offering free lectures, training courses and instruction in operating procedures. In Tanzania, in order to train local medical staff in acupuncture, CMT members allowed local doctors to practise on their own bodies, thereby providing direct tuition in the technique. In this way, they were able to train a large number of medical specialists. CMTs also made the best use of local media to publicise their medical knowledge.³⁹

In Algeria, the CMTs ran training courses on acupuncture without

any form of reservation. They tried every means to raise local medical standards, such as small lectures on reattaching severed limbs, acupuncture, anaesthesia observation, all of which were welcomed by local medical staff. Up to 2008, the CMT in Algeria presented more than 20 training courses, gave more than 30 lectures, and trained more than 300 medical personnel, people who have become the backbone of local medical institutions.

Liberia has suffered from war and chaos for a long time, with a huge increase in the number of people requiring medical attention. The CMT in that country provides both medical services and teaches new techniques to local medical personnel. Their activities caught the eye of David Shinn, the former US ambassador to Ethiopia and Burkina Faso. He said:

*China received praise in Liberia for its medical teams because they prioritise the transfer of knowledge and technology. They sent specialists and general practitioners, who upgraded and built the professional skills of local health workers. In the case of war-torn Liberia, this is a critical medical need.*⁴⁰

Although the Chinese economy has suffered seriously as a result of the financial crisis – especially in terms of exports – and has had to contend with the damage caused by the Wenchuan earthquake, China has kept its promises and made every effort to finish the projects President Hu put forward at FOCAC III. With great effort and close cooperation on both sides, 30 anti-malaria centres were built on time and other medical cooperation measures were fulfilled before FOCAC IV.⁴¹

Following internal health reforms, China's medical assistance to Africa may boost China-Africa cooperation for several reasons. First, the CMT system has laid a solid foundation in Africa and enjoys great popularity in most African countries, especially in rural areas. With the establishment of anti-malaria centres in African countries, China will definitely increase its medical engagement with the continent. Secondly, Chinese medicines, both traditional and modern (such as Cotecxin), have gradually entered the African market. Chinese medicine is cheaper and has developed a good reputation in some African countries in recent years. This, too, will serve as a good basis for medical cooperation. Thirdly, China has experience of rural healthcare systems; experience which may provide useful lessons for African countries. The health sector has recently become an important element in international cooperation in recent years, with Japan, the US and the UK and other OECD countries placing great emphasis on health aid.

These developments will also push China into strengthening its medical cooperation with Africa.

Conclusion

Several African leaders have praised the fruitful cooperation between China and Africa and the CMTs' great achievements. Tanzanian President Nyerere once said: 'I trust Chinese doctors. They have not only got expertise, but also a very strong sense of responsibility'. Gabon President Bongo commented that 'CMT have achieved great success', while Mauritanian President Hairare had this to say of the CMTs: 'Chinese experts are good at working hard with high efficiency. They are not afraid of hardship and work in our areas short of doctors and medicines, and [are] most welcomed by the masses'.⁴² This hard work has brought awards and honours for the teams: Over the past 40 years or more, African governments have awarded various medals to about 600 CMT members in recognition of their great contribution to the improvement of public healthcare in Africa.⁴³ In addition to helping African people, CMTs have also contributed to China's foreign affairs, as well as to the more general humanitarian cause.⁴⁴

However there are obstacles as well. On the Chinese side, although there is an inter-ministerial coordinating commission, China does not have a comprehensive system for providing assistance, and this has affected medical assistance initiatives. For example, while the Ministry of Health takes the lead in sending CMTs, the Ministry of Commerce is responsible for building hospitals and aid facilities. With the more complex assistance available from the medical sector, there will be new problems of coordination. The selection of CMT members is also becoming a tough issue. As the living standard in China rises, doctors enjoy a much better life than before. This creates serious problems for the selection of high-level specialists for CMTs. More favourable measures will have to be adopted to encourage doctors to serve on CMTs. The abuse of Chinese traditional medicine is another serious problem, evident in the misuse of traditional drugs and the existence of fake medicines in Africa.

On the African side, there is also room for improvement. First, CMTs should be deployed in the most effective way. At present, CMT practitioners often provide simple medical services in remote regions where local doctors are unwilling to go. Secondly, in some countries, CMT members are not recognised as doctors, so cannot enter hospitals to provide their services. Thirdly, since the level of medical service is also rising in Africa,

some countries need medical cooperation at higher levels, thus requiring specialists that China itself badly needs. Future medical cooperation will require a joint effort by both China and Africa to find more effective strategies and to establish law enforcement and quality control systems for the medical sector and to guarantee healthy working conditions for both parties.

FOCAC is the main inter-governmental mechanism for comprehensive China-Africa cooperation in various fields, including medical cooperation. It serves as a model of South-South cooperation based on equality and mutual benefit, and has contributed greatly to the improvement of China-African relationships in the past 12 years and enjoys great international influence. With more parties' engagement, more initiatives from African side, and more civil society participation, more milestones will be achieved.

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CHAPTER SIX

Assessing the complexities of Sino-African media exchange and cooperation

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Introduction

Political scientists and international specialists have come round in the past decade to define many aspects of power that in the past had been overlooked. This has been increasingly so not only with the end of the Cold War, but with the growth of instant international mass communications exemplified best by international television networks such as CNN, BBC International, Al Jazeera, and EuroNews. Russia, France, Spain and Portugal also joined the field with international cable and satellite broadcasts that include news, culture, sports and public debates. China has also started implementing an outreach campaign designed to cultivate the attraction of its language, culture, values and diplomacy in Africa and the world, through extensive media influence. The fact is media globalisation cannot be stopped and is a result of new communication technology. It is also the prerequisite and facilitator for all other forms of globalisation that includes multinational organisations such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).¹

In order for China and Africa to effectively promote their common developmental goals, enhance their traditional friendship, and expand their mutually beneficial cooperation under FOCAC, they will have to utilise the media. Both regions suffer from a mostly negative image in the international media which is usually due to the effect of outdated stereotypes. Needless to say, despite globalisation, global travel and the advancement of communication technology, it is surprising that huge gaps and barriers still exist in the understanding between the West and cultures in the South.

Media includes information sources such as newspapers, magazines, radio, television and the internet. Media has also become a bridge between the governing bodies and the general public, particularly since it is a

powerful and flexible tool that influences the public to a great extent. Sean Siochru, at an address for the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalisation, stated that media is a unique product in that it shapes how people think and behave, and is a product of culture which also shapes culture. More importantly, he asserted, media products are different, not least because they are more than mere consumer goods: in important respects they also 'produce' us.²

From an international relations perspective, broadcast media has acquired a growing role in international politics. Because of satellite links which now enable news organisations to originate programming from any part of the globe, the entire world is becoming one, giant sound stage for television news. Therefore, the media are no longer just the media and have an unprecedented input in international politics. The media can be a tool of conflict or instrument of peace. Moreover, they can make traditional borders irrelevant and unify scattered people across the globe.³ Governments around the world are operating in a communication environment that is increasingly becoming competitive which makes the effort by FOCAC to facilitate media cooperation between Africa and China extremely relevant.

Chinese and African media engagement greatly increased from 2000, when it was initiated under the FOCAC framework designed to foster China-Africa cooperation. The 2000 declaration was followed by the FOCAC Action Plan 2007–2009 which expounded the social development cooperation and emphasised media cooperation as follows:

Recognising that increased contacts between their respective news media contribute to comprehensive and objective news coverage of the other side, the two sides encouraged their respective news media to play a positive role in enhancing mutual understanding and friendship. ... The two sides support multi-level exchanges and cooperation in various forms between their press authorities and media and exchange more visits between media groups. ... The two sides support and encourage more report and coverage by their news media of the other side and will provide mutual assistance and facilitation to each other's news agencies in sending resident and non-resident correspondents for news reporting.⁴

At the 2009 meeting in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt, a new action plan expanded the scope of media initiatives to include the following:

- Reinforcing cooperation and exchange between officials and media workers who deal with media on both sides; such as annual workshops, mutual visits, training and producing radio and television programmes.

- The involvement of Chinese communication and information enterprises in building communications infrastructure in Africa and engaging in mutually beneficial cooperation.

Given the complexities involved in changing or influencing culture, perceptions, or global thinking, it is critical to assess the challenges and prospects that both China and Africa endeavour to undertake. The objectives of this chapter are to examine whether or not the key criteria identified for media collaboration, are feasible. The key areas analysed are: exchange and cooperation; mutual understanding; the promotion of Sino-Africa relations; and global branding. The chapter also utilises the theory of cultural diplomacy.

Raymond Williams defines culture as ‘the signifying system’ through which a social order is communicated, reproduced, experienced and explored.⁵ Cultural diplomacy emphasises the role of culture in relations with other countries benchmarked through soft power, and national competitiveness in the global creative economy. In essence, cultural diplomacy is primarily associated with soft power. Nancy Snow writes that ‘soft power is culture power’ and suggests in pragmatic terms that a country has a soft power advantage when:

- culture and ideas match prevailing global norms;
- a nation has greater access to multiple communication channels that can influence how issues are framed in global news media; and
- a country’s credibility is enhanced by domestic and international behaviour.⁶

It is important to note that the soft power concept is not new to China. Confucianism (551–479 BC) opposed the enforcing of values on others. The founder of Mohism (470–390 BC), Mo Zi was against offensive force. Similarly, mind over force was the foundation of strategist Sun Tzu’s Art of War. In practice, propaganda was a key feature of the Maoist state (1949–1976) which used multiple techniques – such as control over the education system and media – to influence the Chinese population.⁷ In early 2010, the People’s Daily published an article in which Premier Wen Jiabao announced that China would engage more actively in foreign cultural exchanges. The article also mentioned that soft power had become a key concept in government sessions, and media which target overseas audiences, would receive more investments over the next 10 years to open and support new stations and to ‘present a true picture of China to the world’.⁸

Sino-Africa exchange and cooperation to date

Sino-African news media exchange and cooperation began in the 1950s, when from 12 December 1955 to 23 January 1956 six Egyptian journalists were invited to China by the All-China Journalists Association. The Egyptian delegation – led by the editor-in-chief of Egypt News Agency – visited Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou. While in Beijing, the All-China Journalists Association, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and various departments concerned, hosted several banquets separately. Furthermore, in the spirit of further cooperation, the Egypt News Agency and Xinhua News Agency signed an agreement on news and pictures exchange. Before leaving China, the delegation wrote a farewell letter which was signed by all the members stating: ‘We shall bring the friendship of 600 million Chinese people to our country, and bring this kind of friendship to the Egyptian people.’⁹

After the initial visit by the Egyptians, journalist delegations as well as government officers in charge of news media affairs from many African countries and regions visited China, some of them met by Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yi and the previous generation of Chinese leaders. African countries and regions that participated included: Algeria, Somalia, Mali, Sudan, Morocco, Ghana, Tanzania, South Africa, Ethiopia, Uganda, Mauritius, Guinea, Central Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, Zambia, Madagascar, Benin, Tunisia, Togo and Burundi. In an exchange gesture, on 8 December 1956, a Chinese delegation of journalists arrived in Cairo to implement the Sino-Egypt cultural cooperation agreement. This was the first Chinese journalist delegation to visit Africa, and members included Jiang Yuanchun from the *People’s Daily*, Yan Biao from Xinhua News Agency, Gao Tian from the *Guangming Daily* and Che Muqi. The Chinese delegation was met by the Egyptian Ministers of Religion and Foreign Affairs.¹⁰

From the year 2000, the exchange and cooperation between Chinese and African news media expanded to include many styles, channels and levels, of a larger and richer scale and frequency. An academic and business aspect was added as from 2004. The China State Council Information Office began to run a press study class for government officials from African countries almost every year.¹¹ Chinese universities began to train staff for African media. The Chinese Media University which specialised in media expertise, was the main base used for training. In May 2007, more than thirty journalists from French-speaking African countries attended the training class for two weeks. In October 2006, more than 20 radio and television

journalists from 15 African countries received radio and television news covering and editing courses.¹²

Apart from exchange visits, there has also been cooperation in the form of technical assistance. In 2005, the China Great Wall industry corporation, a state-owned hardware manufacturer, won a US\$ 311 million contract from the Nigerian government to manufacture and launch the Nigerian communications satellite. In 2006, China sent FM transmitters to Zambia. In 2006, China provided a loan of US\$ 120 million to the Ugandan government for national information communication technology (ICT) backbone infrastructure. Also in 2006, Huawei became the leading CDMA network provider for Nigeria's Multi-Links, a Nigerian private telephone operator. In 2007, three Chinese companies, Sagem, ZTE and Huawei won contracts to lay fiber-optic cable in Kenya.¹³

From an institutional perspective, in 2012, the African Union (AU) announced that it will further develop its relations with China and push cooperation between African media and Chinese media, including Xinhua News Agency. Dr Elham Mahmoud Ahmed Ibrahim, Acting Chairperson of the AU Commission, stated how the media could play a role in the promotion of friendship and understanding between the peoples of Africa and China.¹⁴ Then in 2013, the Chinese government began the New Year by launching China's first institute for African media research, the Africa Communication Research Centre, at the Communication University of China. The Africa Communication Research Centre will further improve China-Africa media cooperation and exchange through academic research and personnel training facilitated by full use of the university's academic resources, the integration of Chinese and Africa media resources and the forging of links between scholars from China and Africa.¹⁵

And so even though media cooperation has developed more slowly and unevenly compared to other FOCAC measures such as trade and human resource development, there have been a number of major accomplishments. To achieve FOCAC objectives, it is essential to determine the dynamics involved in accomplishing the criteria required, particularly since the China and African media platforms are quite different.

In order for China and Africa to effectively use cultural diplomacy under FOCAC, the configuration and production of culture has to be strategised. The production of media concerns, systematic arrangements of the flow of texts in the cycle of production, distribution, and consumption in local, national and international settings. It is therefore essential to establish the context of both regions to determine the best media practices FOCAC could implement.

The complexities of establishing mutual understanding between Africa and China through media cooperation

Today, a vibrant African media environment exists. In cities where there was once only a handful of newspapers, hundreds of media outlets now compete. African consumers are more connected, taking advantage of various forms of communication, from short wave to mobile technology. Currently, there may be 200 newspapers published in a single city such as Kinshasa, the capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo.¹⁶ Africa also engages in liberal and privatised media enterprises. The continent has produced people who could be referred to as genuine 'media giants' who are influencing the regional plateau of information. Some examples of the media moguls are South African Koos Bekker and Desai, Tanzanian Mengi, and Nigerian Dokpesi.

Mr Bekker is the CEO of a US\$ 12 billion media conglomerate Naspers and controls 23 magazines – including *YOU*, *DRUM* and *True Love* – seven newspapers, Brazilian publisher *Abril* and pay-television giant DSTV that broadcasts to 48 countries in Africa.¹⁷ Desai is another South African media conglomerate that owns 16 newspapers, including *Business Day* and *Sunday Times*. Tanzanian Mengi, the founder and CEO of the IPP Group, owns 10 national newspapers – including *Financial Times*, *This Day*, and *The Guardian* – as well as two of the region's most popular television stations, EATV and ITV. IPP also owns 10 radio stations. Dokpesi pioneered the first private television network in Nigeria: Africa Independent Television (AIT) in 1996. It was also Africa's first satellite television station. AIT has gained much coverage since it launched in the US in 2003, and is now received in Mexico, the Caribbean and Europe-wide as well as other countries within Africa on the Hotbird satellite.

Despite the numbers of home-grown media moguls, most scholars and government officials argue that the biggest threat to African media is the powerful foreign media that overshadow it and set the tone for the agenda on African issues. At a 2011 meeting for the Coalition of Development Media, there was an endless call for a Coalition of African media to be created. According to Frannie Leautier of the African Capacity Building Foundation, one of the conference speakers, there should be a coalition of networks and capacity to organise, with different types of media forming a solid hub where the drive is not competition regarding which form of media is relevant, but unity in disseminating information. Bineka Diop, Executive

Director of Femmes Africa Solidarites spoke of building an alliance which would birth a powerful professional news network that would present African current affairs on Africa's terms. 'Media has to monitor and ensure continued networking to construct [Africa's] image, and the mobilisation should be around strategy to build an African invention.'¹⁸ However, in order to accomplish this African media voice, Paulo Games, CEO of the Constelor Group, argued that Africa would need to have 'a regional integration mindset, as the current African media groups were very individualistic' which meant that an African media voice 'was not sustainable'.¹⁹

The fact is that many of the African media houses serve as frontiers for Western media, as in the case of France and Côte d'Ivoire where news flows are predominantly from North to South. Hamelink argues that the creation of information communities in Africa, was a function of colonial legacy, language, education, technical capabilities and transnational business.²⁰ According to Domatob, Sub-Saharan Africa's media technology and practice still demonstrate a strong neo-colonial grip. The state of African media is a reflection of its neo-colonial history and although most African states attained political independence in the early 1960s, media training has been influenced to a large extent by the West.

So far the grooming of media professionals has taken three forms; the attachment of experts from the industrialised countries to media in Sub-Saharan African countries, courses and attachments in industrialised states offered to media practitioners in Sub-Saharan Africa and courses taken at media centres in the region. In fact the pioneer technicians and broadcasters in the Sub-Saharan states of Ghana, Nigeria, Gabon, Cameroon, Burundi and Zaire were trained either by experts from reputed media establishments like the BBC or Radio France International. Others were sent to schools such as Cardiff in England, Institute Francais de Presse in France, Voice of America in the US and Radio Netherlands.²¹

Consequently, communication scholars depend on the philosophical foundations of the Eastern or Western bloc which ensures that the content maintains a heavy Western bias in orientation, style, approach and analytical frames of reference. Furthermore, for the bulk of world news, African media depend on one or more of the five main international news agencies: Reuters, (UK), AFP (France), AP and UPI (US), and TASS (USSR). Reuters and AFP are the most significant, both in their coverage of Africa and in the number of customers using their services.

The regional news agencies such as the Pan-African News Agency follow the same pattern, which begs the question as to whether or not the

promotion of a South-South mouthpiece is possible.²² An example of this challenge is the mostly negative portrayals of China by African media. According to a survey conducted by International Herald Leader in 2006, there were 1 192 African news reports in June and July about China's negative practices in 32 leading media companies of 16 African countries. Since most African countries do not have their own foreign correspondents, their media utilises the Western media's reports²³ and consequently China's image in Africa has been dented to some extent when presented to the African public in general.

Then there is also the cultural aspect. A large percentage of the content on local African television stations is from the West; not much content is produced locally. Even though some private stations have the capacity to create their own local programmes they still end up catering to the consumer interests which has acquired a taste for Western content. In South Africa, e.tv, a privately owned station hosts some HBO shows like The Sopranos, Six Feet Under, Whose Line is it Anyway? and Curb Your Enthusiasm. It has even secured broadcast rights of the World Wrestling Entertainment (WWE)'s various shows.²⁴ It is important to also point out that although e.tv is a South African-based media company, it is now accessible on local stations in most African countries. This factor raises another question as to how the FOCAC agenda under the theme of mutual understanding, should address the cultural mindset of the local television stations?

China media relations, however, have started going global. It is important to note here that the Chinese media is not like the African media which has a conglomerate of stakeholders controlling its content and framework. Since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949 until the 1980s, almost all media in China were state-run. Independent media only began to emerge at the onset of economic reforms, although state-run media outlets such as Xinhua, CCTV, and People's Daily continue to hold a significant market share. China has many newspapers, but the front runners are all state-run: the *People's Daily*, *Beijing Daily*, *Guangming Daily* and the *Liberation Daily*. The two major news agencies in China are Xinhua News Agency and the China News Service.²⁵

The global reach of Chinese media has caused heightened interest in providing media content and programmes, as well as the need for local bureaus. From China's notable strength in hardware industries – such as infrastructure and telecommunications – the recent shift towards soft power recognises the need to influence the hearts and minds of the people in Africa, and to provide a better understanding of Africa in mainland

China, as the government continues to invest and spend on the continent.²⁶

China's presence in Africa has diversified beyond infrastructure assistance and technical training. They now contribute to content creation, coverage and also the hiring of African journalists and reporters. In fact, in January 2012, CCTV Africa began broadcasting programmes focused on China-Africa relations and issues within Africa presented by African professionals. Standing apart from other news outlets, it provides a platform for African views and tries to facilitate knowledge exchange between the Chinese and Africans. China's central government meanwhile, has reportedly allocated 45 billion yuan (US\$ 7.2 billion) to fund the global expansion of state media. CCTV News, which claims 200 million viewers outside China, is now available in six languages; one of its latest ventures is an Arabic news channel. To increase its reach, and to compete with Western news organisations, Xinhua often gives away dispatches to financially struggling news media outlets in Africa, Latin America and South-east Asia. Chinese news media officials chose to set up shop in Nairobi because of its role as a news hub for the English-speaking countries in East Africa.²⁷

In December 2012, Kenya's most widely read newspaper, *The Daily Nation* entered into a partnership with Xinhua, China's state news agency. Kenya's most popular English-language newspapers are now flecked with articles from Xinhua. Kenyan television viewers can get their international news from either CCTV, the Chinese broadcasting behemoth, or CNC World, Xinhua's English-language start-up. On the radio, just a few notches up from Voice of America and the BBC, China Radio International offers Mandarin instruction along with upbeat accounts.²⁸

As in the African case, it is important to note that when reporting on Africa, the Chinese media also tend to adopt a one-sided approach to problems, give more coverage of war, disease, poverty and corruption, and less coverage to development and progress. To a certain extent, while current media coverage has been influenced by Western media, the Chinese media has also created a negative impact for Chinese people to understand Africa and its people.

Given the challenges confronting media relations between the two regions owing to their different histories where Africa has the strong Western influence, and different media corporate strategies such as the various private media houses on the continent, the China-Africa media cooperation need to be fast-tracked. As indicated earlier, despite the various media exchanges in comparison with cooperation exchanges in other spheres such as the political and economical ones, the media sphere is

relatively sluggish in its operational pace. The media exchange still lacks the necessary guidance and coordination internally at the government and media levels of both regions. Global branding of China and Africa cannot work unless it is a well-coordinated structure and process.

Branding of Sino-Africa relations

In a globalised world, countries should manage and control their branding if they are to compete effectively with other countries. Active repositioning of a country through branding can give a country a competitive advantage over other countries. Nation branding can be an important tool in the development of a nation's soft power. A successful nation branding campaign will help create a more favourable image among the international audience, thus enhancing a country's soft power. Cultural diplomacy plays a major role in branding a national image because in addressing configuration of cultural thought, is underpinned by emphasis on politics of cultural diversity. Culture is thus both a commodity as well as means of social transformation.

For many years, the Western media has given negative coverage about China and African countries. In 2012, China's President, Hu Jintao, wrote a document where he argued how China was being battered by Western culture: 'We must clearly see that international hostile forces are intensifying the strategic plot of Westernising and dividing China, ideological and cultural fields are the focal areas of their long-term infiltration.' Essentially, President Hu was saying that China was under assault by Western soft power through its ability to produce outcomes by persuasion and attraction rather than coercion or payment and that China needed to fight back.²⁹

In their reports about China, Western media sometimes defile the reputation of Chinese products abroad, and sometimes concoct the so-called China Threat theory and New Colonialism in Africa. Moreover, when the Western media reports on Tibet, it is simply labeled the 'Tibet issue,' totally disregarding the idea of Tibet as a matter of Chinese sovereignty, instead of a religious, or human rights issue. The reporting of the riots in the late 1980s and the 14 March 2008 riots in Lhasa demonstrated the clique's openly confrontational approach to dealing with the central government, but was instead portrayed as 'high degree of autonomy' campaigns which are basically pro-independence appeals in disguise.

Other common themes in Western media coverage are China's negative

impact on Africa and its dealings with corrupt governments. They regularly report on China as a monolithic entity, criticise China's colonial ambitions and emphasise present circumstances, with little socio-historic explanation of the China-Africa relationship. For instance, *The Guardian* released a cable quoting a US official who described China in Africa as a very aggressive and pernicious economic competitor with no morals. An opinion piece in the *New York Times* described China as a 'rogue' donor, which like Iran and Venezuela has the cash and the will to reshape the world into a place very unlike the one in which we want to live.³⁰

In his paper 'Africa in the Western Media' presented at the Sixth Annual African Studies Consortium Workshop, on 2 October 1998, Rod Chavis stated:

...those Western media moguls, who can find only negative attributes when Africa is the subject, and create Africa's world image almost entirely to serve their capitalistic greed while simultaneously denigrating the continent's global image. It is an image that is put on Africa by outsiders, primarily Europeans, whose abiding motivation is profit. That image is as dark as the pervasive fear conjured up in their minds.

He also asked:

What do negative media images, conveyed by the Western media about Africa, communicate? They portray a no there: no culture, no history, no tradition, and no people, an abyss and negative void. Dark or black connotes fear, foreboding, and evil. Africa is bludgeoned repeatedly by the press: famine, warlords, coup d'état, epidemics, drought, tribalism, and on and on it goes.³¹

On 23 May 2005, Rwanda's President Paul Kagame accused the Western media of portraying Africa as a continent racked by poverty, war and disease, and he challenged Africans to change that image. In an address to the International Press Institute World Congress held in Nairobi, Kagame emphasised that it was a common belief on the continent that the international press gave Africa only negative coverage and ignored positive development on the continent. 'One of the reasons Africa is unable to attract enough foreign direct investment, which we need for our development, is the constant negative reporting.' Former South African President Thabo Mbeki also highlighted the challenges in the media world:

African and Western journalists differed sharply over the way the Western media reports on Africa. Whereas African journalists criticised the Western media for presenting Africa in a bad light, their Western counterparts vigorously defended their position saying they could not ignore the continent's problems, which they described as 'harsh realities'.³²

China, according to Colin Shek, appears to desire to change negative perceptions of Africa. Once described as the 'hopeless continent' by the *Economist*, Africa is frequently characterised through stereotypes, such as conflict, corruption, and poverty. Many scholars have claimed how Western reporting of Africa is problematic as it has been very focused on it being a continent where you only have war, famine and horrible things happening, when anyone who spends any time there can see that is definitely not the whole story. The current Western reporting of claiming into a whole fashion of Africa rising, also seems a bit imbalanced.³³

Needless to say, an effective media exchange and cooperation will not only promote the relations between China and Africa, but also address the imbalances regarding the international news coverage, combat the cultural invasion and infiltration, and safeguard the sovereignty and dignity of China and African countries. Besides the exchanges and enterprise attributes, the media has an important role in helping present China-Africa issues that promote the interests of both regions. At present, the Western media dominates the world public opinion while the voice of developing countries is limited, making it imperative to strengthen media collaboration under FOCAC.

The late President Kwame Nkrumah stated:

...the African mass media must establish progressive political and economic systems upon the African continent that will free men from want and every form of social injustice, and enable them to work out their social and cultural destinies in peace and at ease. In this respect, the African newspaper is a collective educator, a weapon, first and foremost to overthrow imperialism, and to assist total independence and unity.³⁴

What Nkrumah stated in the 1960s is still applicable to the current media situation on the continent. As long as the continent is served by a foreign media-paradox, then Africa will remain without a voice, allowing it to be shaped by the West by way of its political economy and media coverage.

Conclusion

The way forward for Sino-African media exchange and cooperation

Currently, many African countries have adopted a Look East policy, eager to learn from China's success in economic development and longing for closer cooperation with China so as to speed up their own development. However, it is important to point out that branding multi-national organisations is much more than just finding a common theme or agreement, writing catching slogans or window-dressing, but requires a study of the two regions' cultural diversities, media diversities, and soft power sources in order to effectively promote the institutional global image.

The FOCAC media cooperation process should also take into account that with the rise of 'the network society,' issues that have traditionally been considered of domestic or perhaps bi-lateral concern, have been given an international dimension, and vice versa. Various FOCAC measures now have international ramifications in areas such as trade between China and Africa compared to China and the West. Therefore, FOCAC measures have to be promoted with legitimate cultural diplomacy tools that positively portray the impact of Sino-Africa relations globally.

While it is important to maintain some elements of the traditional channels of the Sino-African media exchange and cooperation, it is essential that new strategies should be adopted to strengthen the exchange and cooperation. A forum should be established to discuss the topics related to media exchange and cooperation between China and Africa. This forum could help promote better knowledge and understanding as was the case with the China-Japan-South Korea collaboration which applied regular mechanisms through an exchange forum. Some of these forums could consist of programmes that for example would award prizes to reward excellent journalists who report objective news related to China and Africa. This platform could be implemented under the FOCAC umbrella.

It is also important that both China and Africa should accept the practicalities that the West will never change its media practices on its own. It is unlikely that the West will ever pay attention to South-South cooperation and African development. An officer from the South African government information office put forward a suggestion at a Sino-African Press Symposium in Chengdu in September 2007:

*China and Africa should establish a liaison mechanism to enhance the exchange of information technology and media management. If we make great efforts together, we shall certainly give out a loud voice of reporting a real and correct China and Africa.*³⁵

There is no reason why China and Africa cannot implement an effective joint media strategy. In order to be successful in the endeavour to promote media exchange with mutual understanding, the FOCAC cooperation process should consider the following:

- Cultural diplomacy should be utilised as an important aspect of successful bi-lateral and multi-lateral diplomacy and be implemented through a holistic conceptual framework for sound pragmatic implications.
- Apart from the press, Chinese party and government departments like the Liaison Department of the CPC, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the State Information Office, as well as universities and enterprises correlated with this, should attach importance to Sino-African media exchange and cooperation, and contact African media actively.
- The African media market is very diverse. Sino-African media exchange and cooperation should not only centralise on national government levels, but extend cooperation to local media which is almost non-existent.
- FOCAC should address the challenges related to Africa's donor-driven media and corporate interests. As long as Africa remains mortgaged to Western media systems, the continent will find it difficult to negotiate its way towards new media relations with China.

Media cooperation between Africa and China will allow both regions to pursue an independent media policy founded on mutual respect and reciprocal concessions.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

The way forward for FOCAC and human resource development 2012–2015

Li Anshan and Funeka Yazini April

African governments are under a lot of pressure to address the lack of human resource development on the continent. This lack is severely impeding the continent's growth, be it through lack of service delivery in the public sector, or in various sectors such as mining and rural development. Another human resource concern African governments face, is the fact that the continent not only has the fastest growing labour force in the world, it is the only region that has experienced a continuous increase in the number of working-poor youth and the only region where the percentage of young people who are unemployed, continuously increases year after year. Needless to say, the human resource development initiative under FOCAC provides a welcome relief for most African governments, especially when challenges such as the brain drain have affected the continent's development capacity.

There is no doubt that China's soft power objectives of human resource development in Africa have reached major milestones in a very short period. The chapters in this monograph have already established that in terms of human resource development, China practically runs one of the world's largest short-term training programmes, with plans to bring 30 000 Africans to China between 2013 and 2015. China is also one of the very few countries to increase the number of full scholarships for Africans to study at its universities, a total of 18 000 anticipated between 2013 and 2015.

China's influence and sound relationships in Africa are the result of many years of investment in building relations through aid, trade, and cultural and technical exchange. Contrary to many scholarly views, Sino-African relations are not just the by-product of China's recently booming economy and soaring demand for African raw materials. Besides China's effective delivery on its action plans, there are several reasons why the human resource development relationship is working well under FOCAC.

1. China's emergence as a major economic power in the 1990s is of great interest to Africa's rulers, for various reasons. For some, China is living proof of successful alternatives to Western political and economic models. The semi-colonial Western domination of pre-revolutionary China is often cited in some circles in Africa as broadly comparable to Western colonialism and neo-colonialism in Africa. In particular, the governance and economic conditions imposed by Western donors and the international finance institutions on African governments seeking loans and aid, are often approximated to the 'unequal treaties' imposed on China by the West in the 19th century. China's status as a developing country in the 1950s through the 1990s is often cited by some in Africa as corresponding with Africa's post-colonial experience.
2. China's breath-taking state-led development – especially the lifting of over 400 million citizens from dire poverty within two decades – reinvigorates African critics of the Washington Consensus and encourages those who advocate that Africa look to East Asia for political and economic models. Harking back to the Asian values and cultural relativism debates on human rights and development of the early 1990s, the proponents of this viewpoint argued that human rights and democracy are irrelevant to Africa's development needs, citing China as an exemplar of development without democracy.¹
3. China has established an exceptional record in meeting the aid targets set out under FOCAC with visible results in a short period, which has cultivated a lot of interest in and respect for the country's foreign policy approach. The reason behind the emerging respect is due to the fact that a lot of Western countries have not always been effective in implementing their aid packages. For many in Africa who are physically and intellectually exhausted by two decades of economic reform – supposedly adopted by African governments but driven by Western governments, donors and the international finance institutions – China represents hope that another way is possible in which bread is accorded primacy over the vote.

As Ssenyange indicates, there has been a gap between Western donor commitments and actual delivery. For instance, according to an Oxfam International report of 2006 and 2007, the European Development Fund has since 1975 never disbursed more than 43% of aid promised to ACP countries and in recent years, from 2000 to 2007, the remittances have fallen to as low as 28%.² Consequently, there is currently international consensus that African countries will not achieve most

of the MDGs mainly owing to failure of developed countries to honour commitments made at various international conferences.³ Moreover, globalisation – especially the phenomenon of jobless growth – has resulted in widespread popular disillusionment in Africa with structural adjustment programmes and poverty reduction initiatives. This disillusionment creates conditions for debate as to the viability and efficacy of Western political and economic models in Africa.⁴

4. China's strong sense of national sovereignty and willingness to conduct commerce without political 'strings', certainly contribute to its success. The ability to 'see no evil' is a convenient aspect of the 'Beijing Consensus,' and its rejection of unpalatable aspects, such as economic 'shock therapy' or political reform, make China all the more welcome in many African capitals. China's approach to Africa, including the way it conducts business and the provision of aid, technical support, and the dispatch of medical teams, are all key components of China's influence on the continent.

Following the framework set out by the first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 2000, China-Africa relations are set to advance through a combination of traditional financial aid and technical support programmes, along with rapidly growing bi-lateral trade and investment.⁵ China's global health strategy is making strides, despite the domestic concerns of accessing Chinese volunteers to participate. There have been questions as to whether or not China is acquiring any dividends from the investments it has contributed in human resource development. Going into 2015, it is also critical to examine whether or not the African continent has structured a policy framework to effectively harness the opportunities offered through the FOCAC cooperation initiatives. Moreover, what are strategic considerations for future FOCAC measures under the human resource developmental agenda?

There are currently concerns regarding professional training. Based on interviews of participants and Chinese embassy officials involved in this process, even if the training is well-organised in China, there is very little impact or value-add demonstrated by the candidates upon return to their countries of origin. In fact, professional training is practically viewed as a shopping junket to China. There needs to be better measures to realign the training process where there is visible impact for both regions. The other challenges related to professional training are that it usually targets government officials. However, half of the time some government

departments do not cooperate or send the most relevant people to participate in the China training. The Chinese government may need to evaluate how the training could be designed to ensure that besides the excellent courses provided, maximum developmental leverage is gained from this effort. From the African side, there also needs to be some level of accountability in ensuring that all trained officials have a commitment to developmental growth, and have aptly demonstrated a will and strategy to implement the training measures upon their return. Finally, African governments also need to ensure that training does not remain elitist, which is currently the case.

Although education exchange has been working quite well, it seems it has been one-sided in the sense that the focus has been on Africans going to China. The author in Chapter Three demonstrates how both Egypt and China exchanged academic visits in the 1950s and how that balance needs to be maintained. There also needs to be an increase of Chinese intellectuals to engage in significant exchanges where they stay for an extended period in Africa. Compared to the West, the current modus operandi of exchanges between China-Africa academics is very limited as it tends to focus on one-week delegation visits from a Chinese institution to Africa and vice versa. African scholars do not necessarily understand the Chinese academic schools of thought, and instead tend to always ask the Chinese for their 'models'. The same applies to the Chinese scholars who may not necessarily understand the African thinking or be knowledgeable of their key paradigms. In order to create a level of mutuality and cultural awareness, there needs to be some academic participation by Chinese students and scholars also taking part in academic exercises in Africa, and African scholars in China with more structured approaches that consist of visible output.

African governments also cannot sit back in the academic exchange as the benefits of the research output could benefit the policy decision-making and implementation. African governments should first address the intellectual battle before they can wage a physical battle against violence and poverty and all the other problems the continent currently faces. As the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) states, 'without first internally winning the intellectual battle, Africa cannot pull itself out of its current morass.' UNECA also maintains that Africa's success hinges precisely on its ability to take hold of the field of inquiries by formulating original 'problematics,' that respond to issues that are first and foremost important to Africans and rooted in their own experience. In other words,

before grasping for quick-fixes and economic models from China or any other emerging market, African governments need to support continental scholars in devising collaborative home-grown models with China.⁶

Academic exchanges at the university and institutional level need to become more intense between African scholars and Africa, with more time and research collaboration. The fact is that despite the growth of Africans in China academia, most African academia are still more knowledgeable of Western civilisations and intellectual thought than the Eastern way of thinking.

As Chapter Four also highlights, African governments need to demonstrate more commitment in facilitating knowledge production in their countries. While countries like the US, China and the UK have invested enormous amounts into their intellectuals, most African countries have not invested in research at all. This lack of investment is not because African countries are unable to invest in R&D. Many African governments tend to instead consult donor-funded think tanks whose research is supported and approved elsewhere.⁷ The Chinese, however, are doing everything in their power to grow and develop through an increasing understanding and emphasis on research and technology. It is against this background that the academic exchange cooperation among think tanks between both regions should be properly evaluated.

Regarding the final issue addressed in the monograph, media cooperation, it is important to note that going forward, the recent China-Africa Media Forum is part of the Beijing Action Plan (2013–2015) that spells out cooperation and commitment between Africa and China through mutual understanding and friendship between both sides. The implementation of this process has to be pragmatic, especially with the entry of social media and its complexities. Moreover, the Western media – which is consumer driven and quite popular in African countries which hinges on Western value systems and identity infiltrates heavily into African culture. The challenge of neo-colonialism raised in Chapter Six highlights more concerns regarding Africa's strategy towards the FOCAC human resource developmental initiative.

For example, in the case of academic exchange and knowledge production – unlike the Chinese scholars – there currently is no clear regional or continental structure to deal effectively with the myriad of African academics and think tanks. Every time I attend a China-Africa academic dialogue, the first discussion that emerges among the African scholars – who are always a different team than the previous years – is

that ‘they would like to develop a think tank among themselves to work with the Chinese think tanks.’ When I inform them that the previous year, another group of African scholars attempted the same thing, wrote up a concept note, asked the Chinese for funding, the message does not seem to sink in.

Consequently a lot of time is lost in establishing a new think tank, instead of collaborating with other think tanks to pursue strategic research agendas with China. Chinese think tanks and scholars have purposeful research collaboration strategies and have been successful in delivering on all their objectives; driving the FOCAC think tank academic exchange. The unfortunate fact is that this fragmented approach among African academics, is also reflected in the continental leadership. Given Africa’s fragmented approach and experience with the West before and after independence, the English saying ‘once bitten, twice shy’ is of particular relevance.

In preparation for FOCAC 2015, this monograph proposes the following:

- Human resource training and development – which is seen as a key factor in meeting any government’s strategic, business and operational goals, including the improvement of the quality of service delivery by public institutions – should be structured to become more impact based. While FOCAC has exposed Africans to a lot of professional training, except for the high level of figures, the impact of the training on the ground should be assessed so that the investment becomes a win-win situation.
- Training and exchanges should be re-aligned to promote and facilitate FOCAC objectives in both regions.
- University education and academic exchanges in both regions should be further encouraged from a joint perspective where there are constructive outputs.
- Media is essential in bridging the communication gap regarding both regions on global and regional levels. There is still need for a more comprehensive way of strategising Sino-African media communication as cultural barriers still exist.
- African governments should become more active in academic exchanges as this could benefit their countries significantly. The disjuncture and vacuum that currently exists in Africa between the production of knowledge and the socio-application of that knowledge, needs to be effectively bridged.
- Medical cooperation is very important to African development and international cooperation. There is a long history of medical cooperation

between China and Africa, yet there is room for improvement, such as personnel training, co-creation and production of local medicine and the best use of traditional treatment.

- Strategically promote 'people-to-people' exchanges at the grass roots level which will elevate the FOCAC platform to a higher level.

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FORUM ON CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION

THE POLITICS OF HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT

Since the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), China and Africa have had substantial dialogues about furthering various aspects of human resource development and cooperation between the two sides. The Chinese government has firmly kept its promises to provide the human resource assistance to African countries within the stipulated time. This book assesses specific measures raised under FOCAC which include training and exchange, human resource development, medical cooperation and knowledge production. It further examines the impact of the FOCAC initiatives on human resources capacity. From an African continental side, options are being provided to develop human resource capital on the continent. The significance of China's soft power is determined as to whether the educational initiatives are done to impose superpower practices or implemented as a method of not only alleviating poverty but also promoting better understanding of the two regions. Various questions are raised as to what is the impact of China's soft power blueprint through its education, academic exchanges, training and skills development and medical cooperation on the African continent's future? Furthermore, what does it mean for China to promote human resource capacity and development through cultural or public diplomacy? And what does it mean for Africa to engage in the human resource development initiatives in a joint fashion? The book eventually demonstrates how the educational measures not only promote sustainable development particularly in Africa, but also illustrate a different angle as to how FOCAC is strengthening relations between the two regions through soft power.

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